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INTRODUCTION

The enactment of the South Carolina Probate Code (SCPC), effective July 1,
1987,1 and the South Carolina Trust Code (SCTC), effective January 1, 2006,2
pervasively impacted the substantive law of will and trusts, as well as the
administration of trusts and decedents' estates in South Carolina.3
As part of an ongoing process to revamp and improve the SCPC, 4 the South
Carolina General Assembly, after extensive study, enacted omnibus legislation

1.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-100(a) (2009); see generally S. Alan Medlin, Selected
Substantive Provisions of the South Carolina Probate Code: A Comparison with Previous South
Carolina Law, 38 S.C. L. REv. 611 (1987) (discussing the meaning and impact of substantive
provisions of the South Carolina Probate Code).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-1106 (2009); see generally S. Alan Medlin, The Impact of
Significant Substantive Provisions of the South Carolina Trust Code, 57 S.C. L. REV. 137, 140
(2005) (discussing the impact of the SCTC on common law and statutory trust law in South
Carolina).

3. Articles 4 and 5 of the SCPC also extensively affected guardianships, conservatorships,
and powers of attorney, relating to both property and health issues. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-4101 through -401, 62-5-101 through -624 (2009).

4. For a history of amendments and additions to the SCPC, see S. Alan Medlin, ResultOriented Interpretationsof the South CarolinaProbateCode Create Estate of Confusion, 44 S.C. L.
REV. 287, 288 nn.1 & 4 (1993) (citing Act of June 9, 1986, No. 539, 1986 S.C. Acts 3446 (codified
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in 2013-effective January 1, 2014 5-that augmented, amended, and clarified
the existing SCPC.6 This Article discusses the most significant provisions of the
2013 amendments to the SCPC. 7
II. SIGNIFICANT SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENTS
A. FairAllocation of Trust Receipts Among Beneficiaries
Perhaps the most significant 2013 amendment effected a substantial change
to existing South Carolina trusts and estates law: it provided an additional tool to
a trustee wrestling with the incessant fiduciary problem of fairly and properly
allocating trust receipts among trust income and principal beneficiaries. 8
Although a trust beneficiary may have rights-depending on the intent of the
settlor-to trust income and principal allocated as directed or authorized by the

at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-1-100 through -7-709 (Supp. 1993)); Medlin, supra note 2, at 139 n.11
(citing No. 539, 1986 S.C. Acts 3446).
5. No. 100, 2013 S.C. Acts _. The bill was initially filed as S. 0143 in 2012, but was not
passed out of the Senate Judiciary Committee in 2012. Id. Because of the bill's length, some
members of the committee preferred to allow more time for review of its provisions. Public
hearings and workshops were conducted in the fall of 2012, and the bill, refined by that process,
was prefiled in the Senate on December 18, 2012, for the 2013-2014 legislative session. Id. The
Senate's version of the bill was passed on March 20, 2013, and the House passed its version on May
21, 2013. Id. After the Senate concurred in the House amendments, the bill was ratified and then
signed by the governor on June 7, 2013.
6. This Article was published prior to the effective date of the act. The amendments are
available on the South Carolina General Assembly's website. Act of June 7, 2013, No. 100, §§ 1-4,
2013 S.C. Acts 1, 1-498 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-2-101 through -7-1106), available at
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sessl20 2013-2014/bills/143.htm. However, for purposes of clarity
and brevity, this Article cites provisions ofthe SCPC as they will appear in the South Carolina Code
once the amendments go into effect. This Article refers to the SCPC amendments resulting from
the act as "2013 amendments."
Citations to SCPC provisions amended by the 2013 amendments are designated as "2013
amendments." (S.C. CODE ANN. § 62--_ (2013 amendments)). SCPC provisions prior to the
2013 amendments are cited as they presently appear in the South Carolina Code and 2012
Supplement. (S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-_(2009) or S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-_(2009 & Supp.
2012)).
7. Two of the most significant amendments in the original version of the bill were removed
at the Senate subcommittee level in early 2013: a proposed omnibus revamping of article 5 and a
proposed repeal of the rule against perpetuities. Compare S. 1243, 119th Leg., 2d Sess. (S.C.
2012), available at http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess1l9_2011-2012/prever/1243_20120312.htm
(last updated May 12, 2012, 3:05 PM) (proposing to abolish the rule against perpetuities and
significantly amend article 5), with No. 100, 2013 S.C. Acts 1, 1 (including no proposal to abolish
the rule against perpetuities or amend article 5 in the final amended bill).
8. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-803 (2009); Johnson v. Thornton, 264 S.C. 252, 258, 214
S.E.2d 124, 127 (1975) (recognizing duty to deal impartially with two or more beneficiaries).
Unless the settlor directs the trustee to treat beneficiaries partially-for example, preference might
be afforded a surviving spouse-trust law requires a trustee to treat beneficiaries impartially. § 627-803 cmt. 1. The discussion in this Article assumes that the trustee is required to treat income and
principal beneficiaries impartially.
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settlor, analyses of the allocation of trust receipts issue typically distinguish
between income beneficiaries and principal beneficiaries. 9 In this basic
construct, trust income beneficiaries are analogous to life tenants of outright
ownership interests-they are entitled to the income from the property for lifeand trust principal beneficiaries are comparable to remaindermen of outright
ownership interests.
A trustee has the basic duty to produce a reasonable return from the trust
property.10 Unless otherwise restricted by the settlor, trustees possessed the
power to invest the trust property in any prudent investment, regardless of type. 11
Thus, for example, trustees could choose among different investment categories,
such as stocks, bonds, real estate, and interest-bearing deposits in financial
institutions.12 The particular investment options fell into two general categories:
(1) fixed-income investments, such as bank deposits, with receipts treated as
income; and (2) equity investments, such as stocks, with receipts derived from
capital gains treated as principal.13
Before the advent of modem portfolio theory investing, trustees attempting
to comply with their responsibility to treat beneficiaries impartially could use
only one allocation tool: apportioning the trust's investments between traditional
income and principal categories.14 However, in the 1990s, the modem portfolio
theory of trust investing and receipt allocation began to gain acceptance.
[R]ather than focusing on traditional categories of income and principal
receipts, [modem portfolio theory] considers the overall return of the
trust investments, whether from interest or capital gains. Modem
portfolio theory worries first about obtaining an optimum overall return
and then about fairly allocating the receipts among income and principal
beneficiaries. [Thus, modem portfolio theory] allows an approach to
trust investing that moves from a category-based analysis to a total
return viewpoint.16

9.
See No. 100, 2013 S.C. Acts 411; UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT
7A U.L.A. 434 (2006).
10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79(2) (2005).

§

104(a)b) (2000),

11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-933(C)(5)(a) (2013 amendments); see S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7816(2H10) (2009).
12. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-816(2)IO) (2009).
13. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-904A, reporter's cmt. (2013 amendments) (discussing
traditional investment categories).
14. See No. 100, 2013 S.C. Acts 380 (discussing coordination with the Uniform Prudent
Investor Act).
15. See id. at 380-81.
16. S. Alan Medlin, Limitations on the Trustee's Power to Adjust, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 717, 719 & n.9 (2008) (citations omitted); see also Richard W. Nenno, The Power to Adjust
and Total-Return Unitrust Statutes: State Developments and Tax Considerations,42 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 657, 662 (2008) (discussing the trustee's role as a prudent-investor).
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The nascent modem portfolio theory developed during a period when typical
returns from the stock market significantly outpaced those from fixed-income
investments. 17 Although modem portfolio theory also theoretically applies to
periods during which fixed-income investing would outpace investments in
equities, the foundation of modem portfolio investing is based on the notion that
historical returns from the stock market exceed fixed-income returns.18
Using the modem portfolio theory, a trustee might choose to invest all, or a
substantial portion, of the trust portfolio in equities-rather than fixed income
assets-assuming there would be greater anticipated returns from the investment
in equities.19 Under this investment strategy, the trustee's goal would be to
produce a greater overall return than that produced by a traditional
apportionment of investments between income and principal categories. 20
Assuming that the trustee's reliance on the return from the equity market
produces a greater overall return for the trust, the trustee must still fairly and
properly allocate those returns between trust income and principal
beneficiaries. 2 1

17. See No. 100, 2013 S.C. Acts 411; Medlin, supra note 16, at 724-25.
18. See generally Medlin, supra note 16, at 725. Market events that occurred subsequent to
the initial tenets of modem portfolio theory may have tempered the notion that returns from equities
exceed returns from fixed-income investments-e.g., the dot-com bubble burst of 2000 and the
Great Recession of 2008. See id. The changing texture of the investment market, however, is
further evidenced by the historical highs in the stock market that occurred later in 2013. Market
Update: 1st Quarter 2013, MMBB FINANCIAL SERVICES, http://www.mmbb.org/funds-how-weinvest/market-updates/market-update-october-2013/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) (stating that in
October 2013, the market saw an all-time high for the Dow, as well as for the S&P 500).
19. Of course, "[t]wo different general factors can affect the return on equity investments."
Medlin, supra note 16, at 720. "First, general market conditions can impact the return. Second, the
trustee's choice of specific investments within the general market can affect the return. Thus, a
trustee can make money in a bear market or lose money in a bull market." Id.
20. See id. at 720-21.
21. See id. at 721-22; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79(1)(a) (2007). Any
discussion of investment strategy cannot focus only on returns. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF

TRUSTS § 90(a) (discussing how a prudent investor must consider "an overall investment strategy").
The Uniform Prudent Investor Act requires a prudent investor to consider additional factors as well.
See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT

§2

(1994), 7B U.L.A. 20 (2006). A trustee cannot concentrate

merely on gross receipts and not take into account expenses, such as trustee's fees and taxes, which
may or may not pass through to the benefit or detriment of the beneficiaries. See id. § 2(c)(1)H8).
Moreover, investing in non-fixed-income assets typically requires conversion of the asset to realize
any gain or loss (other than distributions such as dividends). Cf id. § 2(c)(7) (discussing needs for
liquidity). The prudent investor trustee must also consider risk, including the risk of lack of
investment diversity, and specific market choice in determining a prudent course. See id. § 2(b). A
theoretical discussion of returns is largely irrelevant if the trustee makes bad individual investment
choices.
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1. The Power to Adjust
Along with its counterpart uniform act titled the Uniform Prudent Investor
Act (UPIA)22-as well as the Restatement (Third) of TrustS23 -the Uniform
Principal and Income Act (UPAIA) recognized the increasingly popular position
that a trustee should invest for the greatest reasonable total return and allocate
income and principal fairly, regardless of traditional notions of what constitutes
24
income and principal.
South Carolina adopted versions of the UPAIA
(SCPAIA) and the UPIA (SCUPIA) in 2001.25
However, assuming that a trustee-pursuant to modem portfolio theoryinvests for a total return, the trustee needs a tool to fairly and properly allocate
that total return between income and principal.26 Similar to the uniform version,
the pre-2013 SCPAIA provided the trustee with this tool: the power to adjust.2 7
A trustee with the power to adjust could apportion total trust receipts between
income and principal.28
Although the SCPAIA's introduction of the power to adjust afforded the
trustee with additional investment flexibility by providing a receipt allocation
tool, market experience between the SCPAIA's enactment and the 2013
amendments demonstrated that the power to adjust alone may not offer an
adequate avenue for sufficient flexibility in the allocation of trust receipts.29 For
example, in the wake of the Great Recession of 2008, trustees were faced with
virtually nil returns from traditional, fixed-income investments; risky volatility in
the stock market; and depressed values and returns from real estate. 30 In such
market conditions, trustees may find it difficult-if not impossible-to achieve a
positive overall return for the trust. Indeed, even the power to adjust cannot
allocate a fair return to income beneficiaries if little or no overall return exists.

22. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2 (1994), 7B U.L.A. 20 (2006).
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (2007).
24. UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT prefatory n. (amended 2008), 7A U.L.A. 365 (2006 &

Supp. 2013).
25. See No. 100, 2013 S.C. Acts 377-79 prefatory n. (discussing the history of South
Carolina's adoption of the various versions of the Uniform Principal and Income Act); id. at 460-61
gen. cmt. (discussing South Carolina's adoption and recodification of the Uniform Prudent Investor
Act).
26. Medlin, supra note 16, at 722 (stating the "most significant tool afforded to trustees by
the UPAIA is the power to adjust").
27. S.C. CODE ANN. §62-7-904 (2009 & Supp. 2012).
28. See id.
29. Arguably, a trustee with greater flexibility powers has a concomitantly greater potential
for liability for failing to exercise, or improperly exercising, the flexibility powers. See Medlin,
supra note 16, at 723-24. But see S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-904A (2013 amendments) (providing a
trustee some statutory protection for the exercise or non-exercise of the power to adjust). A
thorough discussion of whether the flexibility afforded by the power to adjust is beneficial or
problematic to a trustee is beyond the scope of this Article.
30. Cf Medlin, supra note 16, at 725 (discussing the volatility of the market from the 1990s
to the turn of the millennium and the effect on returns).
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UnitrustConversions and Reconversions

Consequently, the 2013 amendments introduced yet another tool affording
trustees flexibility to apportion distributions between income and principal: the
ability to convert to a "total return unitrust" (unitrust).3i A unitrust allocates
distributions to an income beneficiary based on a percentage of the value of the
trust.32 Unlike traditional investment category allocations or total return
allocations-both of which are based on trust receipts-unitrust allocations
focus on distributions, rather than merely receipts.33 For example, assume that a
unitrust provides for an annual distribution to the income beneficiary of three
percent of the value of the unitrust as of December 31 of the preceding year. If
the total returns for the trust in the current year do not reach three percent, the
trustee would nevertheless distribute three percent of the trust value to the
income beneficiary, effectively reducing the amount of principal by the
difference between three percent and the total return for the current year. In
years during which the total returns of the trust exceed three percent, the unitrust
allocation would be more akin in principle to the power to adjust because the
unitrust actually allocates receipts in years when returns exceed the unitrust
percentage. 34
The 2013 amendments describe the methods by which a trustee can convert
to a unitrust and reconvert from a unitrust (unitrust powers).35 This statutor
empowerment applies to a trust unless the settlor indicates a contrary intent.
However, the question of whether the statutory unitrust authority is conditioned
on the trustee also having the power to adjust remains problematic. The 2013
amendments added the following language to the power to adjust provisions: "In
lieu of exercising the power to adjust, the trustee may convert the trust to a
unitrust as permitted under sections 62-7-904A through 62-7-904P, in which
case the unitrust amount becomes the net income of the trust." 37 If the "in lieu
of' language establishes a condition that the trustee must have a power to adjust
to have unitrust powers, then the trustee may not have either power in certain
cases, even if the settlor has not expressly precluded the trustee's unitrust power.
The power to adjust provisions impose preconditions upon granting a trustee the

31.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-904C(l) (2013 amendments); id. § 62-7-904(B)(12).

32. Id. § 62-7-904B(15).
33. Id.

34. In such years, the 2013 amendments' unitrust provisions offer even greater flexibility to
the trustee: the ability to reconvert from a unitrust to an income trust. Id. § 62-7-904C(A)(2).
35. Id. § 62-7-904C, -904D.
36. Id. § 62-7-9041.
The trustee's unitrust authority, which stems from the 2013
amendments, presumes that the settlor has not already expressed an intention in the governing
instrument to create a unitrust. See id. The 2013 amendments describe such a settlor-directed
unitrust as an express total return unitrust (ETRU). Id. § 62-7-904B(3). Any unitrust limitations set
forth by the settlor-in an ETRU, for example-verride any unitrust authority otherwise granted
by the unitrust statutes. See id. § 62-7-9041.
37. Id. § 62-7-904(A).
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power to adjust.3 8 A trustee does not have the power to adjust in certain cases,
such as when the power to adjust is prohibited by the settlor or when the trustee
can treat beneficiaries impartially without resorting to any power to adjust.3 In
such cases precluding a trustee from having the power to adjust, the "in lieu of'
language in the 2013 amendments might also preclude a trustee from having
unitrust powers.
40
A non-interested trustee, or a majority of non-interested co-trustees, with
unitrust powers can act without court approval to convert to a unitrust that
allocates three to five percent of the trust's value to net income. 4 1 Thus, the
2013 amendments effectively presume that annual distributions to an income
beneficiary within the range of three to five percent of the trust's value treat both
the income beneficiary and, inferentially, the principal beneficiary impartially.42
The trustee may also chane the unitrust percentage,43 as well as the method for
valuing the trust's assets. Accordingly, the continuing powers to change the
distribution percentage and valuation methods enhance the trustee's flexibility to
treat the trust beneficiaries impartially. 4 5
The trustee must five written notice to the settlor-if alive-and to any
qualified beneficiaries. A qualified beneficiary is defined in SCPC section 627-103(12) as a living beneficiary who is entitled to or may permissibly receive
distributions of income or principal, or who would be entitled to or may
permissibly receive income or principal distributions if the current qualified
beneficiaries were deceased or if the trust terminated.4 7 Pursuant to SCPC
section 62-7-303, any qualified beneficia under a legal disability may be
represented by a beneficiary representative.4 If at least one qualified beneficiary

38. See id.
39. See id. (requiring that a trustee apply section 62-7-903(A) and determining that the
trustee is unable to comply with section 62-7-903(B) before utilizing the power to adjust).
40. An interested trustee is defined in section 62-7-904B(6) as a trustee who is a qualified
beneficiary, or who is subject to removal by an interested distributee, or who may satisfy legal
obligations of support by making distributions of trust income and principal. A non-interested
trustee is simply a trustee other than an interested trustee. See id. § 62-7-904C(A).
41. Id. §§ 62-7-904C(A), -904E(B).
42. For an analogous use of the three-to-five percent range for presumptive reasonableness in
a settlor-directed ETRU, see id. § 62-7-904N.
43. Id. § 62-7-904C(A)(3). The resulting percentage after change must remain within the
three to five percent range. § 62-7-904E(B).
44. Id. § 62-7-904C(A)(3).
45. But see supra note 29 (discussing the potential for greater trustee liability as a
consequence of increased flexibility powers). However, as with the power to adjust, supra note 29,
trustees with unitrust powers are afforded some statutory protection. See id. § 62-7-904H; infra
notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
46. Id. § 62-7-904C(A)(3)(b). The trustee must also adopt a written policy defining the
unitrust distributions as unitrust amounts, and provide that any changes to the unitrust percentage or
the method of trust valuation will be in accordance with the policy. Id. § 62-7-904C(A)(3)(a).
47. Id. § 62-7-103(12).
48. Id. §§ 62-7-303, -904C(A)(3)(b)(ii).
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exists, and if no one receiving notice objects in writing within ninety days of the
notice, the trustee may proceed with the proposed conversion. 4 9
If the trust lacks a non-interested trustee, an interested trustee, or a majority
of the interested co-trustees, may nevertheless effect a unitrust conversion or
reconversion.s The interested trustee must follow the same steps required of a
non-interested trustee,51' and also must appoint a disinterested person-acting in
a fiduciary capacity-who will determine for the trustee the unitrust percentages
and the valuation methodology, including whether any trust assets will be
excluded.52
The same process and requirements for a conversion also apply to a
reconversion as well as to any change in the valuation method or the unitrust
percentage. 53
Following either the non-interested or interested trustee process, the 2013
amendments allow a trustee to do for a charitable trust-with charities as both
income and principal beneficiaries-as the trustee could do for a private trust.54
Of course, while the notice provisions are somewhat different for charitable
trusts-under which the trustee must notify the charity or, in certain cases, the
South Carolina Attorney General-the 2013 amendments include some
attempted failsafe provisions designed to revent a trustee from acting to
disqualify a charitable trust for tax purposes.
Although a trustee may exercise the unitrust powers after completing the
required process, 56 the trustee without "the ability to"-because a qualified
beneficiary timely objected after notice-or who "elects not to" exercise such
powers may nevertheless seek court approval to convert, reconvert, or change the
unitrust percentage or valuation method. Thus, a trustee with unitrust powers
may seek court approval to (1) overcome an objection by a qualified beneficiary;
or (2) confirm the prudence of the action, even though court approval is not
required for the exercise of such powers. When only an interested trustee is
serving, 59 the court may-upon the motion of a trustee or person interested in the

49. Id. § 62-7-904C(A)(3)(d).
50. Id. § 62-7-904C(B).
51. Id. § 62-7-904C(B)(3)(a).
52. Id. § 62-7-904C(B)(3)(b). The 2013 unitrust amendments allow real property and certain
tangible personal property to be excluded from the valuation of the trust. Id. § 62-7-904E(A).
Presumably, this exclusion helps to avoid some of those types of valuations and appraisals that can
be both subjective and expensive to obtain.
53. Id. § 62-7-904C(A)(2)3).
54. Id. § 62-7-904C(C).
55. See id.
56. Id. § 62-7-904C(A)B).
57. Id. § 62-7-904D(A).
58. Id.; id. § 62-7-904A(D).
59. Or a majority of co-trustees are interested.
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trust, or sua sponte-appoint a disinterested person who, acting in a fiduciary
capacity, can present relevant information to the court.60
A qualified beneficiary may ask the trustee to exercise unitrust powers, and
if the trustee refuses, may then seek a court order requiring the trustee to act.61
The 2013 unitrust amendments impose requirements for valuation, but allow
trustees to have discretion in averaging values over a period of years and
excluding certain assets-such as a residence and tangible personal propertyfrom the trust's value. 62
In determining the unitrust percentage within the three-to-five-percent range,
the trustee must take into account certain factors63 that are reminiscent of those
the trustee must consider when deciding whether to exercise the power to
adjust. 64
The 2013 amendments require that unitrust distributions be allocated in
accordance with a tiered system.65
Conversion to a unitrust, however, does not otherwise affect the trust's
provisions for principal distribution.66 Unitrust distributions are classified as
distributions of income. 6 7
If acting in good faith, the trustee-as well as any disinterested person
appointed to act in a fiduciary capacity when appropriate-is not liable for
exercising or failing to exercise unitrust powers.68 Instead, the exclusive remedy
for an affected person is to ask the court to order the trustee to exercise the
unitrust power.
3.

Express Total Return Unitrusts

The 2013 amendments recognize that a settlor may create a unitrust with its
own rules. 70 However, unless the settlor provides otherwise, the 2013
amendments contain some default provisions for these settlor-directed unitrusts,
such as prohibitions against changing the unitrust provisions or converting a

60. Id. § 62-7-904D(A)(3). An interested person is defined as a person "having a property
right in or claim against a trust estate." Id. § 62-1-201(23).
61. Id. § 62-7-904D(B)(1)3).
62. Id. § 62-7-904E(A).
63. Id. § 62-7-904E(B).
64. See id. § 62-7-904(B).
65. See id. § 62-7-904E(C).
66. Id. § 62-7-904G.
67. Id.
68. Id. § 62-7-904H.
69. Id. The protection afforded by this section is consistent with the more general protection
provided by the pre-2013 amendment in S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-932 (2009), which was moved in
the 2013 amendments to S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-904A (2013 amendments). Section 62-7-904A
covers the exercise of discretionary acts by a trustee, which would now include not only the power
to adjust-as before-but also unitrust powers. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-904A (2013
amendments).
70. Id. § 62-7-904M. For the definition of an ETRU, see id. § 62-7-904B(3).
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unitrust to an income trust. Any express total return unitrust (ETRU) with a
three-to-five-percent payout presumptively apportions receipts between income
and principal beneficiaries in a reasonable manner. 72
4.

Updatingthe Power to Adjust Limitations

In addition to enhancing flexibility for the allocation of trust receipts and
distributions by introducing unitrust powers to South Carolina law, the 2013
amendments attempted to eliminate what was potentially a significant limitation
on the receipt allocation flexibility of the power to adjust, which before the 2013
amendments probably did not take full advantage of the opportunities stemming
from a liberalization of federal tax rules.73
Before the 2013 amendments, even if a trust met all of the requirements for a
power to adjust, SCPC section 62-7-904(C) prohibited a trustee from exercising
that power in certain situations.74 These limitations, largely tax-related, were
designed to prevent the unintentional creation of adverse tax consequences. 75
An explanation of these tax-related limitations must take into account the
redefinition of income under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 643(b).76 The
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)
promulgated the most recent version of the UPAIA in 1997. 7 South Carolina's
version of the UPAIA became effective in 2001.78 At the time of enactment,
federal tax law based trust income and principal allocation rules on traditional
notions of categorical apportionment.7
Thus, South Carolina's tax-related

71. Id. § 62-7-9040(B).
72. Id. § 62-7-904N.
73. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-904(C) (2009 & Supp. 2012).
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., id. § 62-7-904(C)(1) (preventing adjustment that would reduce an income
interest qualifying for a federal estate or gift tax marital deduction); id. § 62-7-904(C)(2)
(preventing adjustment when it would reduce income interest in a trust containing transferred
property when transfer is intended to qualify for a gift tax exclusion); id. § 62-7-904(C)(5)
(preventing adjustment when it would cause individual to be treated as the owner of the trust for
income tax purposes); id. § 62-7-904(C)(6) (preventing adjustment that would cause trust assets to
be included for estate tax purposes in the estate of an individual with the power to appoint or
remove a trustee).
76. See generally Nenno, supra note 16, at pt. IT (discussing tax consequences of power to
adjust and total-return unitrust statutes).
77. See UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT (amended 2008), 7A U.L.A. 363-64 (2006 & Supp.
2013). For a chart of states enacting some version of the power to adjust, see Nenno, supranote 16,
at app.
78. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-7-401 through -7-432 (Supp. 2001).
79. See Nenno, supra note 16, at 676-77 (citing I.RC. § 643(b) (2006)) (noting that before
the 2004 § 643 regulations were issued, the tax code definition of income "dated to a time when,
under state statutes, dividends and interest were considered income and were allocated to the
income beneficiary, whereas capital gains were allocated to the principal of the trust").
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limitations on the power to adjust attempted to avoid the use of that power in any
way that would run afoul of the federal tax rules.80
For example, the original version of the power to adjust statute prohibited
adjustments that would reduce the income payable to a spouse from a trust
qualifying for the estate or gift tax marital deduction, thereby preventing the
diminution of the spouse's income interest and, with regard to the trust itself,
avoiding disqualification from federal marital deduction treatment.
IRC §
2056(b)(7) requires that the spouse receive all of the income from a qualified
terminable interest property (QTIP) trust.82 A QTIP trust qualifies for the
marital deduction under IRC § 2056(b)(7), even if the surviving spouse has no
interest in the principal.83 Although the estate of the deceased spouse benefits
from the marital deduction for the full value of the QTIP trust, the remaining
principal of the trust is includible in the estate of the surviving spouse for estate
84
tax purposes. Presumably, if the trustee could use the power to adjust to divert
receipts that were typically considered income to principal, the spouse would not
receive all of the income from the QTIP trust, and the trust would not be entitled
to QTIP treatment.8 5 Thus, the pre-2013 version of SCPC section 62-7904(C)(1) eliminated the use of the power to adjust in such cases to prevent the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from arguing that the power disqualified the trust
from QTIP treatment. 86
Other pre-2013 amendment tax-related limitations on the power to adjust
similarly attempted to avoid negative tax consequences for trusts.8 7 For instance,
the pre-2013 version of SCPC section 62-7-904(C)(4) sought to preserve,
without reduction, an income or principal interest to charity by prohibiting a use
of the power to adjust that would reallocate "from any amount that is
permanently set aside for charitable purposes under a will or the terms of a trust
unless both income and principal are so set aside." Another example involved
the attempt to avoid adverse tax consequences resulting from the inadvertent

80. S.C. CODE ANN. §62-7-904(C) (2009).
81. Id.
82. See I.R.C. §2056(b)(7)(A) (2006).
83. See id. §2056(b)(7)(B).
84. See, e.g., Barbara A. Sloan et al., When Income Isn't Yncome'-The Impact of the New
Proposed Regulations Under Section 643, 94 J. TAX'N 325, 334 (Nov. 2001) (discussing new tax
regulations' redefinition of income).
85. See generally 1.RC. § 2056(b)(7) (listing the requirements to receive a marital deduction
through use of a QTIP trust).
86. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-904(C)(1) (2009). The recent expansion of the federal transfer
tax exemption amount, coupled with the introduction of spousal portability of the exemption
amount, has significantly diminished these tax concerns for many trusts. See infra Part II.B.
87. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-904(C)(4)-(8).
88. Id. § 62-7-904(C)(4). This limitation did not apply to a wholly charitable trust-one
without a noncharitable beneficiary-because presumably no adverse tax consequence would occur
if the trustee exercised a power to adjust in a way that reallocated income to principal, or principal
to income, between qualified charitable beneficiaries. See generally I.R.C. § 170 (allowing tax
deductions for charitable contributions).
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creation of a general power of appointment through the exercise of the power to
adjust. 89
However, in 2004, the IRS issued final regulations that redefined "income"
under IRC § 643(b).90 The IRS's redefinition of income generally recognized
the wide acceptance by the states of the total return trust and the power to
adjust.91 The redefinition of income in § 643(b) ripples throughout other
pertinent sections of the IRC dealing with such issues as qualification for the
marital and charitable deductions.92
Determining whether the IRS's redefinition of income affected the
construction of South Carolina's original tax-related limitations on the power to
adjust was problematic because the original version of those limitationsalthough intended to avoid adverse tax consequences-spoke in general terms
and was not limited to situations that created tax problems.93 Thus, even after
the IRS liberalized the tax treatment of the exercise of powers to adjust,9 4 the
limitations contained in the pre-2013 amendment version of SCPC section 62-7904(C) arguably continued to apply, even though the adverse tax concerns had
been resolved by the IRS amendments.95 In other words, even though the federal

89. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-904(C)(5)8) (2009). Any of these situations might cause a
trustee to be treated as the holder of a general power of appointment, which for tax purposes would
cause the trustee to be deemed the owner of the property subject to the power. See I.R.C. § 2041.
Because an adverse tax consequence may not result if such a power was instead exercised by a cotrustee, the pre-2013 amendment version of SCPC section 62-7-104(D) did not restrict the cotrustee from exercising its power to adjust, which is consistent with the theory that a beneficiary,
who is also a co-trustee with the discretion to make distributions to or for his or her own benefit, is
prohibited by general fiduciary principles from exercising that discretion because that would
constitute a conflict of interest. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-814(bHd) (2009). Thus, the cotrustee-beneficiary effectively does not have the power to make self-distributions, despite the trust's
attempt to create that power. See id.; see, e.g., First Union Nat'l Bank of S.C. v. Cisa, 293 S.C. 456,
463, 361 S.E.2d 615, 619 (1987) (finding trustee who was also beneficiary had no power to make
self-distributions).
90. See Nenno, supranote 16, at 677-78 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.643(b)-I (2013)).
91. See generallyNenno, supra note 16, at 677-78 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.643(b)-I (2013))
(attributing the IRS's redefinition of income to an increasing number of states amending statutes
that allow the power to adjust and total return trusts). The amended regulations also recognized the
increasing use of the unitrust. See generally id. at 678 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.643(b)-i (2013))
(providing a safe harbor for state unitrust statutes).
92. See generally id. at pt. III (discussing the implications of the § 643 regulations); Barbara
A. Sloan, § 643 Regulations: Use ofNon-Charitable Unitrustsand Other Issues Raised Under the
Final Regulations, 30 ACTEC L.J. 33 (2004) (discussing the IRS's final regulations redefining
income in IRC § 643 and their impact on the modem portfolio theory). For an excellent, concise
explanation and discussion of the interaction between the tax concepts of distributable net income
and the fiduciary accounting concept of income, see generally Mackenzie P. McNaughton &
Stephanie Anne Lipinski Galland, What You Need to Know About Recent Changes to the Concept of
"Trust Income " UnderState Law and the Code, THE PRACTICAL TAX LAWYER, Spring 2007, at 31.
93. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-904(C) (2009).
94. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
95. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-904(C) (2009).
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tax law no longer contained certain prohibitions against the exercise of the power
to adjust, the state law limitations remained. 96
Consequently, the 2013 amendments updated the state law limitations with
the intention of enabling a trustee to exercise the power to adjust to the full
extent recognized by federal tax law, as amended in 2004.97 Essentially, the
updated language now expressly refers to the tax law and allows a trustee to
exercise the power to adjust, "but only to the extent that making such an
adjustment would cause adverse tax consequences under applicable tax laws and
regulations." 9 8 Presumably, this update removes any concern about whether
state law limitations on the power to adjust are more restrictive than the amended
federal rules.
B. Decanting
1. Benefits ofDecanting

Another significant addition to a trustee's flexibility arsenal came with the
adoption of statutory rules allowing a trustee exercising a power of distribution
to create a second trust99 -R concept popularly known as decanting. 00
Decanting allows the trustee to pour assets from the old vessel (the original trust)
into a new vessel (the second trust) even if the original trust was irrevocable and
did not expressly authorize the creation of a second trust.101
Advocates argue that various benefits may be derived from decanting, such
as the ability to modify administrative or dispositive provisions to accommodate
a change in law,102 to combine trusts for more efficient administration, o0to limit

96. See id.
97. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-904(C) (2013 amendments).
98. Id.
99. See id. § 62-7-816A.
100. Thomas E. Simmons, Decanting and Its Alternatives: Remodeling and Revamping
Irrevocable Trusts, 55 S.D. L. REv. 253, 253 (2010) ("Trust decanting is the process of distributing
a trust estate of an irrevocable trust to the trustee of a new trust."). Although the 2013 amendments
use the term "special power to appoint to another trust," the Reporter's Comment to the
amendments refers to the trustee's "decanting authority." S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-816A, reporter's
cmt. (2013 amendments).
101. Simmons, supra note 100, at 254 (citing William R. Burford & Patricia H. Char,
Renegotiating the Irrevocable Trust: Amending, Decanting, and Judicially Modifying, ALI-ABA
Course of Study, Westlaw SP053 ALA-ABA 325, 333 (2009)).
102. See Simmons, supra note 100, at 255 (including "[a]mending administrative provisions"
and other dispositve changes to a trust as reasons to decant); Diana S.C. Zeydel & Jonathan G.
Blattmachr, Tax Effects of Decanting-Obtainingand Preserving the Benefits, 111 J. TAX'N 288,
291 (2009) (listing "[m]odifying administrative provisions" as a possible reason to decant a trust).
Although the change in law accommodated by decanting might be tax law or property-non-taxlaw, decanting advocates seem most interested in the use of decanting to accomplish beneficial tax
consequences. See, e.g., id. at 288 (focusing on preserving the tax benefits of decanting).
103. E.g., Simmons, supra note 100, at 255. Prior to the 2013 amendments, the combination
and division of trusts for efficiency of administration was allowed under South Carolina law. See,
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the power of interested trustees to avoid adverse tax consequences or conflict of
interest issues, 104 to reform scrivener's errors,105 and to create qualifying trusts
for beneficiaries with special needs. 106 Although many of these goals could have
been accomplished through modification and reformation prior to the 2013
amendments, these actions typically required court approval and allowed
narrower categories of beneficial uses. 07
A trustee's power to decant stems from the trustee's power under a trust to
make distributions of income or principal to one or more beneficiaries. 108 A
trustee with such a discretionary power arguably already possessed the authority
to accomplish results similar to decanting, even without the 2013
amendments. 109

e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-417 (2009) (allowing combining and dividing of trusts). Presumably,
decanting would enable the combination of trusts for a broader range of situations than those
previously allowed. Compare id. ("[A] trustee may combine two or more trusts into a single trust or
divide a trust into two or more separate trusts, if the result does not impair rights of any beneficiary
or adversely affect achievement of the purposes of the trust."), with S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7816A(b) (2013 amendments) ("The trustee of the original trust may exercise this power [to decant]
whether or not there is a current need to distribute principal or income under any standard provided
in the original trust.").
104. See Simmons, supra note 100, at 255; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-816A(e) (2013
amendments) (prohibiting a trustee who is also a beneficiary of the original trust from decanting the
original trust). A trustee with the power to distribute trust property to himself may have a general
power of appointment, which can cause tax inclusion problems, as well as fiduciary conflict of
interest concerns. See id.; see also I.R.C. § 2041 (2006) (noting the tax implications of powers of
appointment); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS

§

19.13

(2011) (defining a general power of appointment). But see supra note 89 (discussing statutory and
case law protections for a trustee who is a beneficiary).
105. See Simmons, supra note 100, at 255. Prior to the 2013 amendments, reformation of
trust documents was allowed under South Carolina law. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-415 (2009).
Previously, however, a court had to approve the reformation. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-415
(2009) ("The court may reform ..... (emphasis added)). Decanting allows for reformation without
court involvement. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-816A(a) (2013 amendments).
106. See Simmons, supra note 100, at 255. Beneficiaries with special needs commonly seek
to qualify for governmental assistance, such as Medicaid. If the governmental assistance
qualification is means-based, a beneficiary's trust interest may disqualify the beneficiary under the
means-based test. See id. (indicating that decanting may be necessary to preserve eligibility for
government assistance). Simply put, although the practice is greatly nuanced and complex, limiting
the beneficiary's distributions to the discretion of the trustee may avoid disqualification. See id.
107. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-7-410 through -417 (2009) (dealing with various
modifications of trusts). Some of these provisions, however, did allow for modification without
court approval. See, e.g., id. § 62-7-417 (allowing division or combination of trusts without court
approval). For a more complete list of possible benefits from decanting, see Simmons, supra note
100, at 255.
108. S.C. CODE ANN. §62-7-816A (2013 amendments).
109. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 19.13.14 (2011) (identifying the appointment powers of donees). The Restatement describes the trustee's
power as a fiduciary distributive power. See id. § 19.14 cmt. f ("[A] trustee or other fiduciary can
exercise a fiduciary distributive power such as a power of invasion to create another trust."). The
Reporter's Note to comment f shows that such a power is also known as a decanting power. Id. §
19.14 reporter's note 4. However, relatively little case law discussed the fiduciary distributive
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The discussion presaging the statutory grant of decanting powers involved
musings about whether a power holder-without specific restriction by the
donor-could exercise the power of appointment by creating a trust with
beneficiaries including some or all of the objects of the power of appointment. 10
A general theme seemed to provide that, unless the donor prohibited the creation
of a trust, no harm resulted from allowing the power holder to do so.il1 The
decanting provisions of the 2013 amendments follow this general theme with
specificity. 12
2.

Statutory Decanting Powers

The new version of SCPC section 62-7-816A empowers a trustee with the
discretion to distribute principal or income to exercise that discretion by creating
a new trust, called a "second trust," without court approval.113 The trustee may
decant regardless of the existence of a current need to distribute income or
principal. 4 The trustee of the original trust may serve as trustee of the second
trust or may appoint a different trustee for the second trust. 115 By creating the
second trust, the decanting trustee is not considered the settlor of the second
trust; this is consistent with the treatment of the decanting trustee as the holder of

power. Id. (noting only one case in support of the fiduciary distributive power to create another
trust). Although technically distinct, the discretionary power of a trustee to distribute income or
principal is analogous to, and in some cases effectively the same as, a power to appoint. The holder
of a power of appointment has the discretion to complete a gift from the donor of the power of
appointment in accordance with whatever rules for appointment are mandated by the power's donor.
Id. § 19.14 cmt. a ("Except to the extent that the donor has manifested a contrary intention, the
donee of a nongeneral power has the same breadth of discretion in appointment to permissible
appointees that the donee has in the disposition of the donee's owned property to permissible
appointees of the power."). Thus, the power holder has a power to complete the gift, but not an
accompanying duty. See id. By contrast, a trustee with discretion to distribute income or principal
has both a power and a duty: without additional requirements imposed by a settlor, the discretionary
trustee's duty is to conduct appropriate due diligence to determine whether to make any
distributions. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-815(b) (2009) ("The exercise of a power is subject to the
fiduciary duties prescribed by this part."). Nevertheless, for purposes of discussing the pre-2013
amendments' theoretical ability to decant, the distinction between the power held by the power of
appointment power holder and the discretionary trustee is a distinction without a difference.
110. See, e.g., 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT ET AL., SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 3.1.2
(5th ed. 2006) (citations omitted) (discussing the exercise of the power of appointment).
111. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS

§ 19.14 cmt. e ("Except to the extent that the donor has manifested a contrary intention, the donee
of a nongeneral power has the authority to exercise the power by an appointment in trust.").
112. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-816A (2013 amendments).
113. Id. § 62-7-816A(a). If, however, the terms of the original trust expressly prohibited the
trustee's creation of a second trust, even the 2013 statutes authorizing decanting would not override
the settlor's expression that no second trust could be created. Id. ("This power [to decant] may be
exercised without the approval of a court, but court approval is necessary if the terms of the original
trust expressly prohibit the exercise of such power or require court approval.").
114. Id. § 62-7-816A(b).
115. Id. § 62-7-816A(c).
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a special power of appointment, rather than a general power of appointment.116
Similarly, the trustee of the original trust cannot exercise the decanting power to
distribute income or principal to the trustee as beneficiary.1 17
The 2013 amendments preclude a decanting trustee from reducing or
eliminating any rights of beneficiaries.'
Consequently, a beneficiary with a
power to withdraw11 9 must have no less of a power under the second trust. 12 0
Nor can a decanting trustee negatively impact the tax status of a beneficiary of
the original trust. 12 1
Similarly, the decanting trustee cannot expand the rights of an original trust
beneficiary. 2 Thus, the trustee cannot accelerate any beneficial right that is
delayed or deferred in the original trust.123 Nor can the decanting trustee reduce
or eliminate any ascertainable standard in the original trust that would govern the
exercise of the trustee's discretion.1 24
The trustee can, however, exercise the power to decant by creating a second
trust with fewer discretionary beneficiaries than the original trust if the
beneficiaries who are eliminated did not have vested rights under the original

116. Id. § 62-7-816A(f)(2). Although non-tax factors exist, an important reason for treating
the decanting trustee as a special power holder, and not the settlor of the second trust, is for tax
purposes: the holder of a general power of appointment is generally considered the owner, and tax
consequences may result from an owner transferring its own property. See I.R.C. § 2041 (2006);
see also supra notes 89, 104.
117. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-816A(e) (2013 amendments). This restriction is consistent with
existing South Carolina law that prohibits such a distribution as a conflict of interest. See S.C.
CODE ANN. § 62-7-814 (2009); First Union Nat'l Bank of S.C. v. Cisa, 293 S.C. 456, 461-62, 361
S.E.2d 615, 618 (1987); supra note 89. Consistent with the existing law, the new section 62-7816A(e) allows a co-trustee to exercise the decanting power to benefit the other co-trustee as
beneficiary. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-814 (2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-816A(e) (2013
amendments). Moreover, if the trust lacks such an independent co-trustee, the court can appoint a
special fiduciary to make the decision whether to decant, which is also consistent with the existing
law. See id.
118. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-816A(d) (2013 amendments).
119. To the extent that the power to withdraw would allow, the beneficiary would be deemed a
general power holder: the IRC defines a general power of appointment as giving the power holder
the authority to appoint property to the power holder, the power holder's creditors, the power
holder's estate, or the creditors of the power holder's estate. I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1)(C) ("[A] power
shall be deemed to be exercisable in favor of a person if it is exercisable in favor of such person, his
estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate.").
120. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-816A(d)(5)(A) (2013 amendments). This limitation does not
apply if the original trust retains sufficient property to fund that power of withdrawal to the full
extent that the beneficiary could exercise it. Id. § 62-7-816A(d)(5)(B).
121. Id. § 62-7-816A(d)(3).
122. See id. § 62-7-816A(d). Allowing a decanting trustee to enhance the rights of an original
trust beneficiary creates the possibility that other beneficiaries will have their rights concomitantly
reduced or eliminated, and that the original trust beneficiary might suffer adverse tax consequences.
See id.
123. Id. § 62-7-816A(d)(2).
124. Id. § 62-7-816A(d)(6). Reducing or eliminating an ascertainable standard effectively
increases the power of the trustee to make a distribution to a beneficiary that the original trust would
not allow, thereby enhancing the rights of the beneficiary. See id.
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trust; otherwise, of course, excluding an original trust beneficiary with vested
rights would violate the rule that the decanting trustee cannot reduce or eliminate
a beneficiary's rights.12 5
The decanting statute also empowers a trustee to give a power of
appointment to any one or more of the beneficiaries of the original trust. 126 The
creation of such a power would endue the new power holder-the beneficiary of
the original trust-with the discretion to invade income or principal to the same
or lesser degree that the beneficiary was able to as a permissible distributee
under the original trust.127 The 2013 amendments even allow the new power
holder to exercise the power in favor of an appointee who was not within the
group of permissible distributees of the original trust.128 At first blush, this
would seem to contravene the restriction placed on the trustee of the original
trust from distributing income or principal outside the class of permissible
distributees of the original trust.129 However, upon deeper examination, this
power simply recognizes that if the original trustee had distributed income or
principal to a beneficiary of the original trust, the distributee could, as absolute
owner, then distribute that property to anyone.130
3.

Processfor Decanting

Section 62-7-816A delineates the process a decanting trustee must follow to
effect the exercise of the power to appoint principal or income.131 The decanting
trustee must give at least ninety days' notice of the intended decanting to all
qualified beneficiaries.13 2 The SCPC definition of a qualified beneficiary' 33 is
based on the concept of a beneficiary being entitled to a trust distribution,

125. See id. § 62-7-816A(a), -816A(d). However, a beneficiary whose potential distributions
of income or principal are subject to a trustee's discretion has no vested rights to income or
principal, unless and until the trustee decides to make such a distribution. Medlin, supra note 2, at
177.
126. Id. § 62-7-816A(d)(7). Although relatively little prior law existed, the general view
expressed by commentators was that the holder of a power of appointment could exercise the power
by creating a new, or second, power of appointment in one or more of the original group of objects.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 19.13-.14
(2011).
127. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 17.1
cmt. f.
128. S.C. CODE ANN. §62-7-816A(d)(7) (2013 amendments).
129. Id. § 62-7-816A(d)(1).
130. This recognizes the difference between a donor's ability to control property while it is in
trust and the inability to control that property once it is distributed outright to a beneficiary, who is
then free to deal with the property as it wishes. For an analogous recognition that a beneficiary of a
decedent's estate is free to enter into a binding contractual arrangement with another concerning the
eventual ownership of that property without court approval, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-912 (2009)
(authorizing so-called binding private settlement agreements).
131. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-816A(g) (2013 amendments).
132. Id. § 62-7-816A(g)(2).
133. Id. § 62-7-103(12).
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whether mandatory or at the discretion of the trustee-the latter of which would
be a "permissible distributee."134 A qualified beneficiary includes current
permissible distributees, those beneficiaries who would be permissible
distributees upon the termination of the current permissible beneficiaries'
potential to receive a distribution, and those who would be a permissible
distributee if the trust terminated.' 3 5 The notice must be given in a signed
writing and include "the manner of the exercise of the power, including the terms
of the second trust, and the effective date of the exercise of the power." 136 If no
qualified beneficiary objects 137 within the ninety-day period, the trustee may
proceed with decanting without court approval.'
The trustee may decant
sooner if the qualified beneficiaries waive their right to the ninety-day notice

period in writing.139
The 2013 amendments empower the trustee to seek court approval for a
The apparent mechanism by which a qualified
proposed decanting.140
beneficiary may object to a proposed decanting is to commence a court
proceeding;141 a trustee in such a case could ask that court to nevertheless give
its approval. However, in certain cases, a trustee might seek court approval even
if no qualified beneficiary objects. As with other fiduciary powers, the exercise
of a power is not necessarily a prudent one, and an imprudent exercise of a
power could lead to an eventual determination of fiduciary liability.
Presumably, if a court approves a trustee's proposed decanting, it would be
difficult for a qualified beneficiary to subsequently prevail on a breach of duty
claim.
The inclusion of a spendthrift provision in the terms of the trust does not
preclude the exercise of the decanting power. 142 Nor do the statutory decanting
provisions limit broader decanting powers granted by the terms of the original
trust. 143

134. Id. § 62-7-103(21), (25).
135. Id. § 62-7-103(12). The definition of qualified beneficiary recognizes the modem estate
planning template of multiple beneficiaries in multiple generations. For example, in the case of a
trust giving the trustee discretion to make distributions of income or principal to the settlor's
children until the last surviving child dies, then to make distributions of income or principal to the
settlor's grandchildren until the last surviving grandchild dies, and then to the School of Law, the
children, grandchildren, and the School of Law would all be qualified beneficiaries.
136. Id. § 62-7-816A(g)(1).
137. Presumably, the objection would be in the form of a qualified beneficiary's timely
commencement of a court proceeding to disapprove of the proposed exercise of the decanting
power. See id. § 62-7-816A(i).
138. Id. § 62-7-816A(a). This assumes that court approval is not otherwise required. See
supra note 113.
139. See id. §62-7-816A(g)(3).
140. Id. § 62-7-816A(i).
141. Id.
142. Id. § 62-7-816A(f)(3). A spendthrift provision prevents the alienation of a beneficiary's
interest in trust property. Id. § 62-7-502.
143. Id. § 62-7-816A(h).
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C. Elective Share andFamily Protection
1. Spousal Protectionin South Carolina
Perhaps no other provisions of the SCPC have generated more controversy
than those dealing with the spousal elective share. Historically, surviving
spouses in South Carolina were protected from disinheritance by common law
rights of dower and curtesy. While a dower provided a surviving wife with a life
estate in one-third of the real estate owned during the marriage by the deceased
husband, curtesy gave the surviving husband a life estate in the lands owned by
the deceased wife if the husband and wife had children surviving from their
marriage.1 44 In 1883, curtesy was abolished,145 and in 1984, dower was held
unconstitutional. 146 Thus, after the abolition of curtesy and until the effective
date of the SCPC in 1987, a wife could disinherit her husband, while from 1984
to 1987, a husband could disinherit his wife.
This ability to disinherit a spouse ended with the enactment of the SCPC. 14 7
For the first time, South Carolina provided a statutory elective share right to a
surviving spouse.148 Similar to the elective share statutes in most states, South
Carolina's version was idiosyncratic and significantly different from the
Uniform Probate Code (UPC) version.149 One substantial difference was that
South Carolina charged only probate assets with the elective share, 5 o while the
UPC included nonprobate assets, as well as property owned independently by the
surviving spouse-the so-called "augmented estate approach."
Prior to the 2013 amendments, the SCPC calculation was relatively simple.
The elective share was one-third of the probate estate-defined as those assets
passing under the deceased spouse's willl 52-less claims and administrative

144. See Medlin, supra note 4, at 290 n.7.
145. Id. (citing Gaffhey v. Peeler, 21 S.C. 55, 62 (1883)).
146. Boan v. Watson, 281 S.C. 516, 519, 316 S.E.2d 401, 403 (1984).
147. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-201 through -207 (1987) (governing the elective
share of a surviving spouse).
148. See Medlin, supra note 1, at 661.
149. See Donna Litman, The InterrelationshipBetween the Elective Share and the Marital
Deduction, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 539, 540 (2005) (stating that elective share statutes vary
considerably from state to state). The original UPC version involved an augmented estate
calculation, which took into account probate transfers and nonprobate assets, as well as property
owned by the surviving spouse. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (1969). Subsequent amendments to
the UPC included a complex calculation based in part on the length of the marriage. UNIF.
PROBATE CODE §§ 2-202 through -203 (amended 2013), 8 U.L.A. 102-04 (1998 & Supp. 2013).
150. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-2-201 through -202 (2009). The statutory limitation to only
probate assets was manipulated as to revocable trusts by South Carolina Supreme Court decisions.
See Seifert v. S. Nat'l Bank of S.C., 305 S.C. 353, 409 S.E.2d 337 (1991); Dreher v. Dreher, 370
S.C. 75, 82, 634 S.E.2d 646, 649-50 (2006).
151. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-201 through -202 (1969).
152. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-201 through -202 (2009). SCPC section 62-2-202 defines the
probate estate to include assets passing by will or by intestacy. Id. § 62-2-202. However, if the
deceased spouse died intestate, the elective share would not be an issue because, in any event, the
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expenses.153 This calculation rendered a gross amount (gross elective share or
gross amount) for the elective share claimant, but the gross amount was reduced
by the value of any probate transfers to the surviving spouse. 154 If the gross
elective share minus the value of probate transfers to the surviving spouse
resulted in a positive amount (net elective share), the spouse could take the net
elective share from the probate estate.' 55 Thus, the elective share claimant would
be entitled to a total of one-third of the value of the deceased spouse's probate
estate.1 s'
Despite the apparent simplicity of the elective share calculation-which,
according to the prior statutory language, excluded nonprobate transfers from
any aspect of the calculation-the South Carolina Supreme Court effectively
changed the calculation in certain revocable trust situations. In Seifert v.
Southern National Bank ofSouth Carolina,157 the South Carolina Supreme Court
determined that a revocable inter vivos trust created by the deceased spouse was
illusory because the settlor retained excessive control over the revocable trust,
thereby rendering it invalid.i1s Because the court concluded that the settlor
failed to transfer his assets to the revocable trust, which was effectively void ab
initio, he still owned the assets at the time of his death. 159 Therefore, those assets
were probate assets subject to the elective share.16 0
The Seifert decision not only affected elective share planning, but possibly
called into question the validity of revocable trusts as a planning tool, even when
used for purposes other than elective share avoidance and despite the common
acceptance of revocable trusts as valid nonprobate transfers.161 The South
Carolina General Assembly responded to this latter concern by enacting SCPC
section 62-7-112, which confirmed that revocable trusts were valid

surviving spouse's intestate share would exceed the one-third amount provided by the elective share
statutes. See id. § 62-2-102. Granted, the inclusion of assets passing under intestacy could be
relevant to the elective share calculation in the event of a partial intestacy. When the testator has a
will that does not dispose of all the probate assets, the assets not covered by the will pass by partial
intestacy. See id. § 62-2-101.
153. Id. § 62-2-202.
154. Id. § 62-2-201 ("If a married person domiciled in [South Carolina] dies, the surviving
spouse has a right of election to take an elective share of one-third of the decedent's probate
estate...."); id. § 62-2-207(a) ("In the proceeding for an elective share, all property (including
beneficial interests) which passes or has passed to the surviving spouse under the decedent's will or
by intestacy ... is applied first to satisfy the elective share and to reduce any contributions due from
other recipients of transfers included in the probate estate.").
155. See id. §62-2-207.
156. Id. § 62-2-201. Of course, valuation ofthe probate estate assets could be contentious.
157. 305 S.C. 353, 409 S.E.2d 337 (1991).
158. Id. at 355-56, 409 S.E.2d at 338.
159. Id. at 357, 409 S.E.2d at 339.
160. Id. For a more thorough discussion of Seifert and its impact on the elective share, see
Medlin, supranote 4, at 289-327.
161. See id. at 325-27.
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nontestamentary transfers. 162 When the General Assembly enacted South
Carolina's version of the Uniform Trust Code, 163 section 62-7-112 was moved to
section 62-7-401(c). 164
Although the legislative reaction to Seifert appeared to assuage possible
concerns about the general validity of revocable trusts as nonprobate transfers,
section 62-7-112 did not prevent the court from continuing to subject the assets
of revocable trusts to the elective share.16 5
One of the issues remaining undecided in the wake of Seifert involved the
treatment of assets passing to the surviving spouse under a revocable inter vivos
trust. The court in Seifert held that, at least in certain cases, the assets of an inter
vivos revocable trust were includible in the elective share calculation of the
probate estate-a total that would be multiplied by one-third to determine the
gross value of the elective share before offset for any probate assets received by
the surviving spouse.
Prior to an amendment in 2010, section 62-2-207 did
not appear to specifically include assets passing to the surviving spouse under
the revocable trust as an offset against the gross elective share.
Thus, at least
in theory, the assets of a revocable inter vivos trust could be included in the
calculation of the surviving spouse's gross elective share, yet the surviving
spouse would not be charged for assets received under that revocable trust.
While the 2010 amendment to section 62-2-207 attempted to include revocable
trust assets passing to the surviving spouse as part of the offset against the gross

162. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-112 (Supp. 1992) (current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7401(c) (2009)). Section 62-7-112 arguably eliminated the court's rationale in Seifert by confirming
the validity of revocable trusts as nonprobate transfers. Id. Although that section provided that "[a]
finding that a revocable inter vivos trust is illusory and thus invalid for purposes of determining a
spouse's elective share rights ... shall not render that revocable inter vivos trust invalid, but would
allow inclusion of the trust assets ... only for the purpose of calculating the elective share," a court
considering the Seifert issue after the enactment of section 62-7-112 would seemingly have to find
the transfer illusory for some reason other than the fact that the inter vivos revocable trust was never
valid. Id.; Seifert, 305 S.C. at 356, 409 S.E.2d at 339 ("[N]othing in the Probate Code prohibits a
trust, declared invalid as illusory, from reverting to the probate estate and being included in it for
elective share purposes."). The South Carolina Supreme Court subsequently recognized this issue
in Dreher v. Dreher, 370 S.C. 75, 83, 634 S.E.2d 646, 650 (2006), effectively continuing to use the
Seifert rationale to subject the assets of a revocable inter vivos trust to the elective share calculation
by finding that "the Dreher Trust is illusory and thus invalid for elective share purposes, but remains
valid for all other purposes."
163. Uniform Trust Code, No. 66, 2005 S.C. Acts 280. For a thorough discussion of the
substantive provisions of that act, see Medlin, supra note 2.
164. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-401(c) (Supp. 2012).
165. See Dreher,370 S.C. at 81, 634 S.E.2d at 649.
166. See Seifert, 305 S.C. at 357, 409 S.E.2d at 339 ("Since nothing in §§ 62-2-201 and 62-2202 prohibits the proceeds of a trust, once declared invalid or illusory from being included in the
probate estate, we hold that the proceeds of the trust should be included in Husband's estate for the
purpose of calculating Widow's elective share.").
167. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-207 (2009) (containing no specific provision that
includes assets passing to the surviving spouse through a revocable trust as an offset), with S.C.
CODE ANN. § 62-2-207 (Supp. 2012) ("A beneficial interest ... includes an interest as a beneficiary
in property passing under the decedent's will to an inter vivos trust created by the decedent.").
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elective share, no court has considered whether the language of the amendment
accomplished that goal.168
2. A New Elective Share Calculation
The 2013 amendments substantially change the elective share calculation
methodology and clarify some of the previously unclear issues.
Most significantly, the 2013 amendments expand the list of assets included
in the section 62-2-207 calculation of the offset against the gross elective share,
as calculated under sections 62-2-201 and 62-2-202.169 The surviving spouse
will now be charged with probate assets, as well as certain specified nonprobate
assets received as a result of the deceased spouse's death: those nonprobate
assets passing under a revocable inter vivos trust or by a beneficiary designation
in a life insurance policy or retirement plan. 170 Thus, a deceased spouse may
provide for the surviving spouse, at least in part, by nonprobate transfers that
will reduce the gross elective share amount.171
Example 1. A deceased spouse's probate estate is valued at $750,000.
Multiplying that amount by one-third renders a gross elective share of
$250,000. The deceased spouse's will devises a house worth $100,000
to the surviving spouse, who is also the beneficiary of the deceased
spouse's life insurance proceeds of $60,000. The value of the house and
the life insurance proceeds are charged against the gross elective share,
leaving the surviving spouse a net elective share of $90,000, which can
be taken from the probate estate.
Example 2. A deceased spouse's probate estate is valued at $750,000.
The deceased spouse was the settlor of a revocable inter vivos trust
worth $150,000. The surviving spouse is not a beneficiary of the
revocable trust. If a court-pursuant to Seifert, Dreher,and apparently
section 62-7-401(c)--includes the value of the revocable trust for

168. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-207 (Supp. 2012).
169. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-207 (2013 amendments); see also id. §§ 62-2-201 through -202.
170. Id. § 62-2-207(a). The 2013 amendments do not amend the language of section 62-7401(c), the successor to section 62-7-112; thus, a court may ostensibly-pursuant to Drehercontinue to include the assets of a revocable inter vivos trust in the total amount subject to the gross
elective share. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-112 (Supp. 1992) (current version at S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 62-7-401(c) (2009)); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-401(c) (2013 amendments); Seifert, 305 S.C. at 357,
409 S.E.2d at 339; Dreher,370 S.C. at 81, 634 S.E.2d at 649.
171. Whether this system is any fairer than the previous method is debatable. Perhaps the
fairest system, a UPC-like augmented share system, see supranotes 149-51 and accompanying text,
involves extensive administrative and potential litigation costs, as well as complications, which
could effectively constitute an equitable distribution system at death. Presumably, the General
Assembly rejected this approach when enacting the 2013 amendments because, inter alia, clawing
back previous nonprobate transfers from third parties could be problematic, if not impracticable,
especially if the nonprobate transferee is in another jurisdiction.
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purposes of the elective share calculation, the "deemed" probate estate
would be $900,000. Multiplying that amount by one-third renders a
gross elective share of $300,000. The deceased spouse's will devises a
house worth $100,000 to the surviving spouse, who is also the
beneficiary of the deceased spouse's life insurance proceeds of $60,000.
The value of the house and the life insurance proceeds are charged
against the gross elective share, leaving the surviving spouse a net
elective share of $140,000, which can be taken from the probate estate.
Example 3. A deceased spouse's probate estate is valued at $750,000.
The deceased spouse was the settlor of a revocable inter vivos trust
worth $150,000. The surviving spouse is a beneficiary of the revocable
trust, with that beneficial interest being valued at $30,000. If a courtpursuant to Seifert, Dreher, and apparently section 62-7-401(c)includes the value of the revocable trust for purposes of the elective
share calculation, the deemed probate estate would be $900,000.
Multiplying that amount by one-third renders a gross elective share of
$300,000. The deceased spouse's will devises a house worth $100,000
to the surviving spouse, who is also the beneficiary of the deceased
spouse's life insurance proceeds of $60,000. The value of the house, the
life insurance proceeds, and the value of the beneficial interest in the
revocable trust are charged against the gross elective share, leaving the
surviving spouse a net elective share of $110,000, which can be taken
from the probate estate.
Example 4. A deceased spouse's probate estate is valued at $750,000.
The deceased spouse was the settlor of a revocable inter vivos trust
worth $150,000. The surviving spouse is a beneficiary of the revocable
trust, with that beneficial interest being valued at $141,000. If a courtpursuant to Seifert, Dreher, and apparently section 62-7-401(c)includes the value of the revocable trust for purposes of the elective
share calculation, the deemed probate estate would be $900,000.
Multiplying that amount by one-third renders a gross elective share of
$300,000. The deceased spouse's will devises a house worth $100,000
to the surviving spouse, who is also the beneficiary of the deceased
spouse's life insurance proceeds of $60,000. The value of the house, the
life insurance proceeds, and the value of the beneficial interest in the
revocable trust are charged against the gross elective share, leaving the
surviving spouse a net elective share of zero because the total of the
nonprobate assets charged against the surviving spouse exceeds the
gross elective share.
As demonstrated by Examples 3 and 4, the 2013 amendments allow the
deceased spouse to use the revocable inter vivos trust to provide for the surviving
spouse and to accomplish a consistent treatment of the value of the trust and the

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol65/iss1/4

24

Medlin: The South Carolina Probate Code Patched and Refurbished: Version
SOUTH CAROLINA PROBATE CODE: VERSION 2013

2013]

105

beneficial interest of the surviving spouse.172 Both values are included in the
elective share calculation: the former for purposes of the gross elective share,
and the latter for calculation of the offset reducing the gross elective share. 1 73
3.

Right to Demand Conversion to Unitrust

The 2013 amendments provide another innovation to South Carolina elective
share law: giving the surviving spouse the right to demand the conversion of a
trust to a unitrust. 174
The SCPC allows a deceased spouse to partially avoid the elective share by
devising to the surviving spouse a beneficial interest in a trust that qualifies for
federal tax purposes as a QTIP trust. 17 5 Generally, a trust qualifies for QTIP
treatment if the surviving spouse is entitled to income for life and does not share
the income with anyone.
Section 62-2-207, which reduces the gross elective
share by the value of the property interest received by the surviving spouse,177
has a special valuation rule that applies to a beneficial interest qualifying for
federal tax QTIP treatment: for purposes of offsetting the gross elective share,
the surviving spouse is charged with the full value of the trust property subject to
the beneficial interest, even though that beneficial interest is for income only and
does not include an entitlement to trust principal.178 Clearly, a beneficial interest
in only income is not worth the full value of the underlying trust property, 17 9 yet
section 62-2-207 deems the income interest to be worth the full value of the
underlying property for elective share offset calculation purposes. 1s Thus, a

172. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-2-207, -401(c) (2013 amendments).
173. See id. §§ 62-2-201 through -202, -207. As discussed previously, such a consistent
treatment was not certain in the wake of the Seifert and Dreher decisions before the 2013
amendments. See supra notes 161-168 and accompanying text.
174. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-207(c)(3) (2013 amendments). See supra Part II.A.2. for a
discussion of unitrusts.
175. See Medlin, supra note 1, at 662 n.231 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-207 (1976)).
176. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B) (2006). Of course, as is typical of tax rules, the actual
requirements for QTIP treatment are more complex and detailed. See §2056.
177. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-207(a) (2013 amendments). As discussed previously, prior to
the 2013 amendments, only probate assets were included in this amount, but the 2013 amendments
include certain specified nonprobate transfers as well. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying
text.
178. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-207(c)(1) (2013 amendments) ("For purposes of this
provision, the value of the electing spouse's beneficial interest in property which qualifies for the
federal estate tax marital deduction pursuant to § 2056 of the IRC, as amended, ... must be
computed at the full value of the qualifying property.").
179. The actual value of the income interest-similar to a life estate in property not in trustis dependent on the life expectancy of the beneficiary. The IRC provides tables that delineate these
life expectancies and the related values of the life estates. See I.R.C. § 7520 (2006).
180. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-207(c)(1) (2013 amendments). This section thus provides a
simpler-albeit inexact-method of valuing the beneficial interest. This simpler treatment harkens
back to the method for the admeasurement of dower: if the wife so chose, a life estate in one-third
of the deceased husband's real estate was deemed to be one-sixth of the property's value. Estate of
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deceased spouse could partially avoid the full impact of the elective share by
giving the surviving spouse a QTIP interest, which would result in the surviving
spouse being charged with a greater value than what was actually received.' 8'
Regardless of whether the value methodology for QTIP interests under
section 62-2-207 is fair, the recent economic conditions surrounding low fixedincome returns182 adds additional difficulty for a surviving spouse with only an
income interest. In the past, an income interest might produce a decent annual
return for the surviving spouse-for example, five percent. The more recent
economic conditions make it difficult to guarantee such a return for an income
beneficiary, unless the trustee uses tools such as the power to adjust or the
unitrust.18 By giving the surviving spouse the right to demand a unitrust
conversion for a QTIP interest, a more reasonable three-to-five-percent return for
that income interest can be assured. 184 However, by allowing the surviving
spouse to demand conversion to a unitrust, the value of the principal
beneficiaries' (or remaindermen's) interests will likely be diminished.s18 In
effect, the principal beneficiaries would be giving back some of the benefit
derived from the valuation methodology under section 62-2-207.186

Kennedy v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 343, 346 (D.S.C. 1969) ("[1]n South Carolina... it is
traditionally assumed that the widow may, by way of dower, claim either a one-third life estate in
her deceased husband's lands or a one-sixth interest in fee simple."); Geiger v. Geiger, 57 S.C. 521,
529, 35 S.E. 1031, 1035 (1900) ("The rule is to allow one-sixth absolutely in lieu of one-third for
life.").
181. See Medlin, supra note 1, at 662 n.231 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-207 (1976)). This
"semi-avoidance" technique also allows the deceased spouse to control the remainder interest,
which would not be possible for probate assets taken by the surviving spouse pursuant to section 622-207. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-207 (2013 amendments).
182. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
183. See supra Part II.A.
184. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-207(c)(3) (2013 amendments). This statute provides the
spouse with "the right to require a conversion of the income trust to a total return unitrust as defined
in the South Carolina Uniform Principal and Income Act." Id. Presumably, the trustee with the
unitrust powers would have the discretion to choose the appropriate unitrust percentage, within the
statutory three-to-five-percent range, as with other statutory unitrusts. See id. § 62-7-904E(B). And
presumably, a surviving spouse who is dissatisfied with the chosen percentage may seek redress,
subject to the protections afforded to a trustee with unitrust powers. See id. § 62-7-904H; supra
notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
185. See generally id. § 62-7-904P reporter's cmt. (discussing the background for enacting the
UPIA and recognizing that "[t]here is a ftindamental distinction ... between needs of trust income
beneficiaries and those of trust principal or remainder beneficiaries" that may cause the value of
those various interests to be at odds with one another).
186. See generally supra notes 174-181 and accompanying text (discussing QTIP treatment
and the valuation methodology under section 62-2-207).
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4. Classificationand DistributionRules
The 2013 amendments to the elective share statutes clarify some issues that
remained unresolved since the original implementation of the elective share
right.
Two connected issues involve (1) whether the elective share, once allowed,
is a fractional share or a pecuniary share, and (2) whether the elective share is
satisfied with date of death or date of distribution values of probate property.
In the parlance of estate planners, a fractional share entitles the surviving
spouse to one-third of each asset of the probate estate, while a pecuniary share
entitles the surviving spouse to a dollar value.187 Prior to the 2013 amendments,
the elective share statutes arguably created a fractional share for the surviving
spouse because section 62-2-201 described the elective share as one-third of the
However, section 62-2-207(b) provided that the elective share
probate estate.
would be "satisfied from the probate estate with devises abating in accordance
with section 62-3-902 [South Carolina's order of abatement statute]."l 89 The
statutory order of abatement specifies which assets are more hierarchically
protected when the probate estate is insufficient to satisfy the testator's intended
devises: generally, specific devises are most protected, followed by pecuniary
devises, and then residuary devises.190 The reference in section 62-2-207 to the
order of abatement supports a counterargument that the pre-2013 amendment's
elective share was pecuniary, rather than fractional: if the elective share was
fractional, giving the surviving spouse a one-third interest in every probate asset,
reference to the order of abatement would be unnecessary.191
Whether a share is fractional or pecuniary could affect whether the surviving
spouse's elective share is entitled to income or appreciation during the estate's
administration,192 particularly when juxtaposed with the issue of when the assets
used to satisfy the elective share are valued. If assets satisfying the elective
share are valued at the date of death, then presumably no consideration would be

187. See S. Alan Medlin, Howard M. Zaritsky & F. Ladson Boyle, Construing Wills and
Trusts Duringthe Estate Tax Hiatus in 2010, 36 ACTEC L.J. 273, 276-78 (2010); F. Ladson Boyle,
DistinguishingPecuniaryand FractionalDevises, 5 PROB. PRAC. REP., May 1993, at 1.

188. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-201 (2009).
189. Id. § 62-2-207(b).
190. See id. § 62-3-902(a)(2). A demonstrative devise is a devise of a total value to be paid to
the extent possible from a specific fund or source. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS &
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.1(3) (1999). The order of abatement treats a demonstrative

devise as a specific devise, to the extent the specific fimd or source exists, and as a general devise
for the difference. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-902(a)(2) (2009).
191. Thus, although the pre-2013 amendment elective share was most likely fractional, the
existence of the counterargument created possible confusion. The rebuttal to the counterargument
would be that reference to the order of abatement was necessary, even if the elective share was
fractional, because the deceased spouse's will may have devised some probate assets to the
surviving spouse so that the surviving spouse would not need to take a one-third share in each of the
remaining probate assets, thereby requiring the spouse to resort to the order of abatement.
192. Whether a share is subject to expenses and depreciation may also have an effect.
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given to appreciation or depreciation in value. Because neither the fractional
versus pecuniary nor the date of death versus date of distribution issues were
specifically addressed in the pre-2013 version, some uncertainty persisted. 93
The 2013 amendments attempt to clarify those issues. Section 62-2207(c)(2) provides that the elective share is pecuniary, and assets used to satisfy
the elective share are valued at the date of distribution.19 4 Therefore, the amount
of the elective share is determined as a dollar amount according to the estate's
value at the deceased spouse's date of death, and the assets used to pay that
dollar amount are valued at the date of distribution.195
5.

Time to Assert

The 2013 amendments eliminate a potential time limit trap for the electing
spouse. Prior to the amendments, the surviving spouse had to file a summons
and petition within the later of eight months after the deceased spouse's death or
"six months after the probate of the decedent's will."1 96 The 2013 amendments
add a third leg to the "later of' alternatives: "thirty days after a surviving spouse
is served with a summons and petition to set aside an informal probate or to
modify or vacate an order for formal probate of [the] decedent's will."19 7 Under
the various time limits of the SCPC, a will proponent might present a will for
probate (new will) later than the 1re- 2 013 amendments time limit for
commencing an elective share claim.
In such a case, the surviving spouse

193. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-207 reporter's cmt. (2013 amendments) (noting
how the 2013 amendments clarify many of these issues).
194. Id. § 62-2-207(c)(2). Because the pre-2013 amendment elective share was most likely
fractional, see supra note 191, the specific provision of the 2013 amendments treating the elective
share as pecuniary is perhaps better described as an amendment, rather than a clarification.
195. Id. The resulting matrix could still lead to positive and negative consequences to the
surviving spouse and the other devisees. For example, the surviving spouse's share will not be
liable for costs and expenses during administration, other than funeral and administration expenses,
and enforceable claims, see id. § 62-2-202, but would not benefit from any appreciation of an asset
between date of death and date of distribution. Of course, this matrix could change based on
individual facts and circumstances involving individual probate assets.
196. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-205(a) (Supp. 2012). Since the term "probate" is not specifically
defined, it might mean the qualification of the decedent's will as valid, or the administration of the
decedent's estate; both meanings are common to probate jargon. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW
DICTONARY 1239 (8th ed. 2004) (providing that one definition of probate is "[t]o administer (a
decedent's estate)"). If the latter meaning applied to pre-2013 amendment section 62-2-205, then
the six months would expire after the conclusion of the administration of the decedent's estate,
which would not seem to be a reasonable result. The 2013 amendment attempts to make it clear
that the former meaning applies-the qualification of the decedent's will as valid-by commencing
the six-month leg of the time limit at the "informal or formal probate of the decedent's will." S.C.
CODE ANN. § 62-2-205 (2013 amendments). Whether the attempt was successful is problematic.
See generally id. § 62-1-201(17), (22) (defining formal and informal proceedings).
197. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-205(a) (2013 amendments).
198. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-205 (2009) (describing the time limits for filing a
petition to receive the elective share), with S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-308 (2013 amendments)
(governing appeals from the probate court), id. § 62-3-108(A)(1)-(2) (describing time limits for
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might have eschewed an elective share because the decedent either appeared to
die intestate or the will being administered was satisfactory to the surviving
spouse. If the new will failed to devise a satisfactory amount to the surviving
spouse, it might have been too late to then commence an elective share
proceeding. The 2013 amendments allow the surviving spouse some time to
assert an elective share claim in any new will situation.199
D. Revocation by Divorce
The SCPC includes several sections that revoke a testator's will-in whole
or in part-based on assumptions about the testator's intent, rather than the
expression of an intent to revoke. 2 00 These situations include a testator who is
divorced after the execution of a will (the revocation by divorce statute), 201 a
testator who marries after the execution of a will and is survived by that
2 03
Because
spouse,202 and a testator who has a child after the execution of a will.
these statutes are based on presumptions about a testator's intentions, they are
rules of construction that can be overridden by the testator's expression of a
different intention.204 When applicable, these statutes revoked a testator's will 20 5
to the extent necessary to omit an ex-spouse, give an intestate share to a
surviving spouse married after the will's execution, and give an intestate share to
a child born or adopted after the will's execution. 2 06
Prior to the 2013 amendments, the revocation by divorce statute applied only
to devises under a testator's will. 20 7 Although section 62-7-607 applied similarly
to revocable trusts by assuming that a deceased settlor did not want to transfer
revocable trust property to an ex-spouse, South Carolina law did not otherwise
presumptively revoke any other nonprobate transfer to an ex-spouse.208 Because
substantial value transfers today by nonprobate means, the lack of a statutory
presumption revoking nonprobate transfers other than revocable trusts created a
trap for the unwary.

commencing informal proceedings), and id. § 62-3-412 (describing time limit for commencing
formal proceedings).
199. The 2013 amendments make similar adjustments to the applicable time period for
asserting an omitted spouse's claim, S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-301(c) (2013 amendments), and an
omitted child's share, id. § 62-2-302.
200. The ability to revoke is a right granted by statute. See id. § 62-2-506 (requiring an
expression of intent to revoke accompanying an act of revocation).
201. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-507 (2009); id. § 62-7-607.
202. Id. § 62-2-301.
203. Id. § 62-2-302.
204. See id. §§ 62-2-301(a)(1), -302(a)(1).
205. And, in the case of S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-607, a revocable trust.
206. See supra notes 201-03.
207. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-507 (2009).
208. See id. §62-7-607.
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Example 5. Testator, while married, executes a will naming Spouse as
devisee and obtains a $1 million life insurance policy naming Spouse as
beneficiary. Testator and Spouse then divorce. Spouse thus becomes
Ex-Spouse. Testator dies without changing the will or the life insurance
beneficiary designation. Prior to the 2013 amendments, section 62-2507 would presumptively revoke the testamentary devise to Ex-Spouse,
but not the life insurance beneficiary designation. Ex-Spouse would
receive a $1 million windfall, unless Testator intended for Ex-Spouse to
remain the life insurance beneficiary, even after the divorce.
The 2013 amendments broaden the scope of section 62-2-507 to include not
only wills, but also nonprobate transfers. 2 09 As amended, that section
presumptively revokes any revocable transfer, whether probate or nonprobate. 2 10
Although section 62-2-507, as amended, eliminates the trap for the testator
and nonprobate transferor who would not want an ex-spouse to benefit, a testator
and nonprobate transferor who wants to benefit an ex-spouse must express that
intention.211
E. SurvivorshipRequirement

Before the 2013 amendments, South Carolina followed the basic common
law rule that a beneficiary had to survive the decedent to take from a testator's
probate estate or by revocable nonprobate transfer.212 However, section 62-2104 carved out an exception for intestacy: the heir had to survive the intestate
decedent by at least 120 hours.213 South Carolina followed the Uniform
Simultaneous Death Act (USDA) for situations in which it could not be
determined whether the decedent or a beneficiary survived-for example, in a
common disaster. 14

209. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-507 (2013 amendments). As a result, section 62-7-607 becomes
redundant because section 62-2-507 now presumptively revokes revocable trusts as one of the
nonprobate transfers also covered by that section. See id. § 62-2-507(c); id. § 62-7-607.
210. Id. § 62-2-507(c).
211. See id. Of course, best lawyering practices would not rely on rules of construction, which
can change or be applied in a way that renders a result different from actual intent, but would
proactively and specifically express the intent of the testator and nonprobate transferor to avoid
having to resort to rules of construction.
212. See generallyRESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS

§ 5.5 cmt. a (1999) ("Because testamentary transfers take place at the testator's death, not when the
will was executed, they cannot be made to individuals who fail to survive the testator.").
213. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-104 (2009). This rule did not apply if an escheat would result.
See id. ("This section is not to be applied where its application would result in a taking of the
intestate estate by the State under [s]ection 62-1-105.").
214. See id. § 62-1-501 through -508. The most recent iteration of South Carolina's version of
the USDA could be found in sections 62-1-501 through -508. That iteration followed the 1940
version of the USDA. See UNIF. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT §§ 1-11 (1940), 8B U.L.A. 164
(2001). The new USDA version contains survivorship requirements similar to those in the 2013
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The 2013 amendments apply the policy of section 62-2-104 to all transfersboth probate and nonprobate-and require a probate or nonprobate beneficiary to
survive the decedent by 120 hours, which must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence.215 Because the amendments to part 5 of article I operate as
a rule of construction, the 120-hour survivorship requirement would not apply if
the decedent indicates a contrary intent.216 Similarly, the 120-hour survivorship
requirement would not apply if its application would cause the invalidation
of a
2 17
vested right, effect a negative tax consequence, or cause an escheat.
F. Disclaimers

The SCPC allows any person, or one who has authority to act on a person's
behalf, to disclaim any interest in property transferred by any means whatsoever
to the disclainant.21 Disclaimers are used for tax purposes219 and non-tax
purposes, such as the attempted avoidance of the disclaimant's creditors. 22 0
However, to be effective for tax purposes, a disclaimer must not only be
effective under state property law, but must also satisfy the requirements of the
applicable federal tax law. 21 In some states, the failure to satisfy tax
requirements while accomplishing a disclaimer for state property law purposes
could lead to the worst possible result for the disclaimant: the disclaimant would
have effectively renounced any interest in the property for ownership purposes,
but would still suffer the adverse tax consequences the disclaimant intended to
avoid. Before the 2013 amendments, such a disastrous result was apparently not
possible in South Carolina because of two appellate decisions.222 In the In re

amendments. See UNIF. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT § 1-12 (1993), 8B U.L.A. 147 (2001).
Because of S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-104, the South Carolina version of the USDA was irrelevant for
intestacy situations.
215. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-1-501 through -504 (2013 amendments).
216. See id. §62-1-506.
217. Id. § 62-1-506(3), (5)-(6).
218. Id. § 62-2-801(c)(1). Prior South Carolina law was similar in many respects, but also
differed in several significant areas. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-37-10 through -80 (1976)
(repealed 1986) (governing the disclaiming ofproperty interests).
219. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2518 (2006) (treating a disclaimed interest as if it had never been
transferred to the disclaimant). The discussion of the use of the disclaimer as a tax tool is beyond
the scope of this Article. For a discussion of the history of disclaimers in South Carolina, see Albert
L. Moses, Renunciations and Disclaimers Under South CarolinaLaw, 31 S.C. L. REv. 667 (1980).
220. For an example of a disclaimer for other than tax purposes or the avoidance of creditors,
see Pate v. Ford, where the decedent's son disclaimed his interest in an attempt to accelerate the
distribution of the estate to the decedent's grandchildren. 293 S.C. 268, 280, 360 S.E.2d 145, 152
(Ct. App. 1987), rev'd, 297 S.C. 294, 376 S.E.2d 775 (1989). The concept of an effective
disclaimer, whether for tax or other purposes, has been muddied by the United States Supreme
Court. Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 52 (1999) (holding that a disclaimer was ineffective to
avoid a federal tax lien).
221. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2518 (providing federal tax provisions for disclaimers).
222. See infra notes 223-226 and accompanying text.
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Will of Hall2 2 3 case, the state court of appeals concluded that a disclaimer had to
satisfy the tax law requirements to be valid in South Carolina, even for non-tax
purposes. 224 In In re Estate of Holden v. Holden,225 the state court of appeals
construed the applicable disclaimer section of the SCPC to require compliance
with federal tax law.226 Under this view, a disclaimant who fails to complete a
qualified disclaimer for federal tax purposes does not relinquish ownership of the
property because the attempted disclaimer fails for state law purposes as well.227
This at least avoids the worst case scenario of having a disclaimer deemed
invalid for tax purposes, yet valid for state law purposes. In such a case, the
disclaimant would fail to accomplish the desired tax result, yet also lose
ownership of the property-a disclaimant's nightmare.
The 2013 amendments clarify not only that disclaimers qualifying under the
IRC are valid for state law purposes as well-unless otherwise barred by state
laW2 28-but also that, despite the apparent result under Hall and Holden,
disclaimers could be valid for state law purposes, even if the federal tax
requirements were not met.229 A disclaimer made for the avoidance of creditors

223. 318 S.C. 188, 456 S.E.2d 439 (Ct. App. 1995).
224. See id. at 192, 456 S.E.2d at 441 (quoting I.R.C. § 2518 (2006)) (citing S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 12-16-1910 (Supp. 1993)). The opinion pointed to a stated purpose of the applicable state law
disclaimer statute as the basis for dovetailing federal tax law requirements with state law validity.
Id. at 190 n.1, 456 S.E.2d at 440 n.1 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-801(f) (1987)) ("It is the
intent of the legislature of the State of South Carolina by this provision to clarify the laws of the
state with respect to the subject matter hereof in order to ensure the ability of persons to disclaim
interests in property without the imposition of federal and state estate, inheritance, gift, and transfer
taxes."). The court apparently disregarded the express language of the state law disclaimer statute.
See id. at 192, 456 S.E.2d at 441 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-801 (Supp. 1993)) (providing
that a disclaimer can be made according to the statute "[in addition to any methods available under
existing law, statutory or otherwise"). The gist of the opinion was to limit valid disclaimers to only
those complying with the state disclaimer statute, and to interpret that statute to include only those
disclaimers that qualified under 1.R.C § 2518. Thus, although the result in this case may be proper,
the court may have unnecessarily restricted the application of the state law disclaimer statute to only
those situations qualifying for tax purposes. For a discussion of disclaimers in South Carolina prior
to the disclaimer statute, see Moses, supranote 219, at 671-72 (citations omitted).
225. 336 S.C. 456, 520 S.E.2d 322 (Ct. App. 1999).
226. See id. at 460-61, 520 S.E.2d at 324-25 (quoting I.R.C. § 2518(b) (1994)); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 12-16-1910 (Supp. 1998); Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(e)(1) (1997)).
227. See id. (quoting I.R.C. § 2518(b); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-16-1910; Treas. Reg. § 25.25182(e)(1)).
228. S.C. CODE ANN. §62-2-801(c)(10) (2013 amendments).
229. See id. § 62-2-801(a). The separation of tax requirements from state law disclaimer
requirements is further demonstrated by the clarification that a disclaimer for non-tax purposes can
be made within a reasonable time of the transfer, with a presumption-based on tax law-that nine
months is a reasonable time within which to disclaim. See id. § 62-2-801(c)(2) ("Unless barred, a
disclaimer must be made within a reasonable time after the disclaimant acquires actual knowledge
of the interest. A disclaimer is conclusively presumed to have been made within a reasonable time
if made within nine months after the date of effectiveness of the transfer as determined under
subsection (d)(3).").
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is not a fraudulent transfer if the disclaimer complies with the requirements of
the disclaimer statute.230
The 2013 amendments also clarify when a fiduciary or representative can
disclaim and the process for doing so.231 Notably, a parent can disclaim on
behalf of a child, unless
the disclaimer results in the disclaimed interest passing
232
outright to the parent.
G. Multiple PartyAccounts
The 2013 amendments continue the statutory recognition of multiple party
accounts held in a financial institution, covering the basic categories of the rights
of parties among themselves-both during lifetime and at death-and the
responsibilities of financial institutions.233 The amended multiple party account
provisions simplify, clarify, and enhance the pre-amendment rules.
1. Types ofAccounts and Persons Involved
Under the 2013 amendments, a party is a person who has a present right to
be paid from the account. 234 A party is not an agent or a beneficiary, as neither
is presently entitled to payment from the account.235 An account may be for a
single party or for multiple parties.236 Of course, the sole accountholder of a
single-party account may withdraw some or all of the funds in the account,237
and an funds remaining at the accountholder's death will pass as a probate
asset.
If an account has multiple parties, each party is entitled to withdraw
from the account to the extent of that party's net contribution, "unless there is

230. Id. § 62-2-801(c)(7).
231. See id. §62-2-801(e)(1)H3).
232. Id. § 62-2-801(e)(4). The restriction prohibits a parent with a conflict of interest from
acting on behalf of a child, as do similar restrictions on a parent's representation of issue found
elsewhere in the SCPC. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-1-403(2)(iii), 62-3-1102(1), 62-7-303(a)(6)
(2009).
233. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-6-101 through -307 (2013 amendments).
234. Id. § 62-6-101(7). Although the amended section 62-1-201(32) defines a person to
include entities other than individuals, the amended multiple-party account rules do not apply to
accounts established for a business or charitable purpose, or for a fiduciary account when the
fiduciary relationship is established other than by the terms of the account-for example, a bank
account established by the trustee of a testamentary trust. See id. §§ 62-1-201(32), 62-6-102.
235. See id. § 62-6-101(7). An agent is not entitled to the account, either presently or
subsequently. See id. § 62-6-201(C). A beneficiary may be entitled to the account subsequently.
See id. §62-6-201 (B).
236. Id. § 62-6-103(a).
237. See id. § 62-6-201(A). Because the financial institution and the accountholder may agree
to other contractual terms of the account, the withdrawal by a single party may have consequences
beyond the scope of article 6, such as a premature withdrawal penalty. See id. § 62-6-106.
238. Id. § 62-6-202(c).
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clear and convincing evidence of a different intent."239 Upon the death of a
party, that party's net contribution in a multiple-party account passes to the
remaining parties in equal shares, unless the terms of the account specify a nonsurvivorship arrangement.240 However, if the deceased party is the spouse of a
surviving party, the deceased party's net contribution passes to the surviving
spouse to the exclusion of any non-spouse party.2 4 1
A party may designate an agent, or a beneficiary, or both to an account.24 2
An agent is authorized to make transactions for a party, 243 but has no beneficial
right to the account. 244 Thus, the 2013 amendments recognize that some parties
may wish to create what may be described as a "convenience account," having
an agent who is able to act for the party but not be an owner of the funds.2
Unless the account terms provide otherwise, an agent's account authority
survives a party's disability or incapacity, but terminates at the death of a sole
party or, in the case of multiple parties, at the death of the last surviving party. 24 6
A beneficiary is entitled to the account funds upon the death of a party or, if the
account has multiple parties, upon the death of the surviving party.
The 2013 amendments provide a sam le check-the-box form to create the
various types of multiple party accounts. 2 4 A financial institution using a form
substantially similar to the statutory sample "is protected in acting in reliance on
the form of the account." 2 49 Even if the financial institution uses a form not
substantially similar to the sample, the statutory provisions applicable to an
account "most nearly conform[ing] to the depositor's intent" apply.2 50

239. Id. § 62-6-201(A). If a party withdraws more than that party's net contribution, any other
party may have a claim against the withdrawing party, but with certain exceptions, infra notes 25154 and accompanying text, the financial institution will not be liable for the excess withdrawal. Id.
§ 62-6-306(a).
240. See id. § 62-6-202(a).
241. See id. § 62-6-202(a). For example, Husband (H), Wife (W), and Adult Child (C)
establish a multiple-party account. H's net contribution is 2X, W's net contribution is 2X, and C's
net contribution is X. Upon H's death, his net contribution of 2X passes entirely to W. The deemed
net contribution of Wbecomes 4X, while C's net contribution remains X.
242. Id. § 62-6-105.
243. See id.
244. Id. § 61-6-201(C).
245. For instance, an elderly parent might designate an adult child as an agent to help conduct
account transactions.
246. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-6-105 (2013 amendments). Even though the agent's authority may
have terminated, a financial institution dealing with the agent may nevertheless not be liable. See
id. § 62-6-304 reporter's cmt. The permissible continuation of an agent's authority, despite a
party's incapacity, provides a simple alternative to a durable power of attorney or conservatorship.
247. See id. §§ 62-6-101(3) & -202(b)).
248. See id. § 62-6-104(a).
249. Id. § 62-6-104 reporter's cmt.
250. See id. § 62-6-104(b).
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2. FinancialInstitution Responsibility
As with the pre-2013 amendment multiple-party statutes,251 a fmancial
institution is not responsible for allowing withdrawals, except in certain cases,
such as (1) paying to the personal representative of a decedent's estate without
proof that the decedent was the survivor of all persons on the account, whether
as party or beneficiary, unless the account was non-survivorship; 2 52 (2) paying to
a beneficiary without proof that the beneficiary survived all parties;
or (3)
after receiving written notice from a party-or from the party's personal
representative, conservator, or attorney in fact under a durable power of
attorney-failing to allow a withdrawal.
The 2013 amendments continue to allow the creditor of a deceased party's
estate to reach the decedent's interest in an account if the probate assets are
otherwise insufficient to pay the claim, but reduce the time limit to assert the
claim from two years-under the pre-amendments statute-to only one year
from the decedent's death.255
H. Conformance and Clarifications
A number of the 2013 amendments clarify existing statutory provisions or
allow some statutes governing wills to conform with those governing trusts.
1. Will Reformation and Modification
For both tax and non-tax reasons, the modification and reformation of
donative transfer instruments is fairly common in the estate planning and probate
arenas.256 Modification involves a change to the document and to the donor's
intention.257 By contrast, reformation merely changes the language of the
document to reflect the original intentions of the donor.ss Unlike modification,
reformation does not change intent, but merely corrects the document so that it
accurately reflects intent.
The SCTC introduced several statutory methods for

251. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-6-101 through -113 (2009).
252. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-6-302(2) (2013 amendments).
253. See id.

254. Id. § 62-6-306(b). The written notice is effective only if the financial institution has a
reasonable opportunity to react. Id. Moreover, a financial institution with reason to believe that a
dispute exists may withhold payment. Id. § 62-6-306(c).
255. Compare id. § 62-6-205 (one year time limit), with S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-6-107 (2009)
(two year time limit). The one-year time limit is consistent with the ultimate time limit for
presenting a claim against a decedent's estate, with certain exceptions. See id. S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 62-3-803(a) (2013 amendments).
256. See Medlin, supra note 2, at 154-64.
257. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-410 through -414, -416, -417 (2013 amendments).
258. See id. §62-7-415 reporter's cmt.
259. See id.
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modification, either with or without court involvement, depending on the
circumstances. 260
The pre-2013 amendment version of section 62-7-415 allowed judges to
reform trusts with court approval for mistakes of fact or law:
The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to
conform the terms to the settlor's intention if it is proved by clear and
convincing evidence that both the settlor's intent and the terms of the
trust were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or
inducement. 261
Because reformation, as a remedial tool, merely corrects mistakes in the
document, and because it does not change intent, reformation is not as expansive
a tool as modification can be. The 2013 amendments add a conforming
reformation provision for wills, using language similar to the reformation statute
for trusts.262
As with trusts, the will reformation statute does not authorize a change of
intention, but only a correction of the document language to accurately reflect
intention.263 However, in conformance with section 62-7-416-which allows the
modification of trusts for tax reasons-the 2013 amendments also provide
statutory authority to modify a testator's will to accomplish the testator's tax
264
objectives.
2. PostmortemProperty
SCPC section 62-2-602 recognized what may be obvious: a testator's will
passes all the property or probate assets owned at death, whether the property
was acquired before or after the will's execution.265 Because a will has
historically been described as speaking at the testator's death, what was not as
obvious was whether a will could transfer property acquired by the testator after

260. See Medlin, supra note 2, at 156-64.
261. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-415 (2009). A classic mistake seen in reformation cases is the
scrivener's error. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 12.1 cint. i, illus. 4-6, cint. j (2003) (providing explanations and examples of a
scrivener's error, though referring to it as a mistake in expression).
262. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-601(B) (2013 amendments) (reformation provision for
wills); see also id § 62-7-415 (reformation provision for trusts).
263. See id § 62-2-601(B); see also id § 62-7-415 (allowing reformation of a trust to conform
to the settlor's intention).
264. See id. § 62-2-806; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-416 (2009) (allowing modification
of wills for tax reasons). Perhaps the most common and liberal use of will and trust modification
has been to achieve beneficial tax results consistent with the testator's and settlor's tax objectives.
See Medlin, supra note 2, at 160.
265. S.C. CODE ANN. §62-2-602 (2009).
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death.2 66 The 2013 amendments clarify that a testator's will also transfers "all
property acquired by the testator's estate after the testator's death."2 67
3.

Conversion ofa Specific Devise by an Attorney-in-Fact

A specific devise-a devise of a particular item or fund-is the most
protected category of devise under the order of abatement, 2 68 but is the only type
of devise subject to ademption.269 Ademption occurs when the specifically
devised asset is not owned by the testator at death-that asset is not part of the
probate estate.270 Under the general common law identity theory, a specific
devisee was not entitled to a substitute for an adeemed asset.
SCPC section 62-2-606(a) changed the general common law rule for
ademption in certain cases.272 If the specifically devised asset was converted273
by the testator and an amount was owed to the testator from the conversion, the
specific devisee received a substitute for the adeemed property: the right to
collect the debt.274 The specific devisee would not be entitled to any amounts
actually paid to the testator, if competent.275 However, if the testator was
incapacitated at the time of the conversion and protected by a conservator,
section 62-2-606(b) provided an additional substitute for the specific devisee: the
amount paid to the testator. 27 6 The pre-2013 amendment version of section 62-2-

266. See, e.g., Shaw Family Archives, Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 309,
314 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussing whether Marilyn Monroe's will devised a postmortem right of
publicity).
267. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-602 (2013 amendments).
268. See id. §62-3-902(a).
269. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS

§ 5.2

cint. c (1999).
270. See id. § 5.2.
271. See id. § 5.2 cmt. b. The more recently recognized intent theory might provide a
substitute for the adeemed asset if a court concluded that the testator intended for a substitute. See
id. Moreover, some courts have prevented an ademption by finding that the specifically devised
asset was part of the probate estate because the change to the asset was one of form rather than

substance. See, e.g., Pepka v. Branch, 294 N.E.2d 141 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973) (adopting and applying
the "form and substance test"). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER

DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.2 cmt. d. For example, the specific devise of a testator's savings
account in X Bank, Account # 12345, might not be adeemed if, after the will's execution, the
testator transferred the savings account to a certificate of deposit in the same bank. See generally
Medlin, supra note 1, at 656 n.202 (discussing South Carolina's treatment of changes effected on
property during a testator's lifetime).
272. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-606(a) (2009).
273. More specifically, the types of conversion covered by the statute are sales, losses covered
by casualty or fire insurance, condemnations, and foreclosures. See id. § 62-2-606(a).
274. See id. Typically, this situation would involve a purchaser giving a note to the testatorseller evidencing the unpaid purchase price. See id. § 62-2-606(a)(1). Under section 62-2-606(a),
the specific devisee would receive the note as a substitute for the converted property. See id.
275. See id.
276. See id. § 62-2-606(b). Of course, if there were unpaid amounts, the specific devisee
would also be entitled to the right to collect the debt under section 62-2-606(a). See id. § 62-2-
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606(b) did not specifically address the situation in which a conversion occurred
while an incapacitated testator was represented by an attorney-in-fact under a
durable power of attorney. 27 7 The 2013 amendments clarify section 62-2-606(b)
by applying its provisions to conversions occurring while the testator was
incapacitated, but represented by an attorney-in-fact under a durable power of
attorney.278
4.

Overridingthe Anti-Lapse Statute by Words of Survivorship

South Carolina's anti-lapse statute-yet another statutory rule of
construction-attempts to prevent the lapse of a devise when the devisee
predeceases the testator.279 Unless the testator indicates an intention for the antilapse statute not to apply, the anti-lapse statute allows the issue of the
predeceased devisee to take that devise by representation if the predeceased
devisee is "a great-grandparent or a lineal descendant of a great-grandparent of
the testator."2
Courts and commentators have disagreed about whether a devise that merely
contains words of survivorship, such as "to B if B survives me," with no other
indication of intent, is sufficient to override the application of an anti-lapse
statute.281 On one hand, the use of such words of survivorship might simply
state the obvious-that B has to survive the testator to take the devise-and,
therefore, do not override the anti-lapse statute. The contrary argument is that
recognized will construction principles give meaning to all language in the

606(a)(1). The additional right to the amount paid was limited only to the case when the conversion
occurred while the testator was protected by a conservator. See id. § 62-2-606(b). The additional
benefit conferred by section 62-2-606(b) was based on the traditional principle that only a
competent testator may change a will. See generally Medlin, supra note 2, at 143-44 (citations
omitted) (discussing the requisite mental capacity to create a valid will). Converting an asset that
results in an ademption effectively changes a testator's will. Section 62-2-606(b) did not apply if
the testator regained capacity for at least a year after the conversion. See id. § 62-2-606(d).
Presumably, if that testator did not make a change to the will to compensate, the conversion and
consequent ademption suited the testator.
277. Id. § 62-2-606(b). Allowed by every state, a durable power of attorney changes the
general rules of agency and authorizes a principal to appoint an attorney-in-fact, or agent, to act for
the principal even during the principal's incompetency. See id. § 62-5-501; Medlin, supra note 2, at
145 (citing id. § 62-5-501).
278. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-606(b) (2013 amendments). The 2013 amendments,
therefore, adopt the theory that the specific devisee should be protected because the testator was
unaware of the conversion and unable to react. See id.
279. Or is deemed to have predeceased the testator. See supra Part II.E and accompanying
discussion.
280. See S.C. CODE ANN. §62-2-603(A) (2013 amendments). A testator could, for example,
indicate the intent not to apply the anti-lapse statutes by naming a substitute beneficiary or simply
stating that the anti-lapse statute is not to apply. See id. § 62-2-603 reporter's cint.
281. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.5
cmt. h (1999). South Carolina has no case precedent on point.
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document if feasible; a conclusion that the words of survivorship merely state the
obvious renders that language meaningless and superfluous. 2 82
The 2013 amendments to the anti-lapse statute clarify that the use of words
of survivorship, without additional evidence, presumptively indicates the
testator's intent to override the application of the anti-lapse statute. 2 83
5. Awarding Costs and Fees in Will Cases
SCPC section 62-7-1004 allows a court to award costs and fees for or
against parties in trust matters.284 The 2013 amendments add a parallel
statutory
2 85
authority allowing the court to award costs and fees in will matters.
6. Signing Trusts by Proxy
SCPC section 62-2-502, which contains the requirements for executing a
valid will, requires that-among other things-a testator sign the will. 2 86 This
section also allows a proxy to sign on behalf of a testator if in the presence and at
the direction of the testator.287 The 2013 amendments authorize a similar proxy
procedure for the settlor's execution of a trust document. 28 8
7. Exempt PropertySet-Aside
The SCPC introduced the concept of an exempt property set-aside to South
Carolina law.289 Section 62-2-401 protects certain assets from claims of
creditors-which was not new to South Carolina law29 0-but also allows the
statutory beneficiaries to claw back certain assets from other beneficiaries. 29 1
The exempt property set-aside beneficiaries are the surviving spouse or, if none,
any minor or dependent children of the decedent.292 Prior to amendment, the set-

282. See id. § 5.5 cmt. a. The Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative
Transfers opines that the majority view agrees with the position of the 2013 amendments. See id.
But see UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603(b)(3) (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 165 (Supp. 2012) (taking
the opposite position).
283. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-603(C) (2013 amendments).
284. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-1004 (2009).
285. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-111 (2013 amendments).
286. Id. § 62-2-502.
287. See id.
288. See § 62-7-402(b).
289. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-401 reporter's cmt. (2009).
290. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-30 (Supp. 2012) (creating homestead exemptions from
creditors' claims for debtors); Scholtec v. Estate of Reeves, 327 S.C. 551, 554, 490 S.E.2d 603, 604
(Ct. App. 1997) (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-30(1)1 1) (2009)) (explaining which categories of
the homestead exemption statute apply to a decedent's estate).
291. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-401 (2013 amendments).
292. Id.
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The 2013 amendments, however, increase this

8. Interested Witness
The law of wills accepts the basic evidentiary notion that an interested
witness is less credible. 2 9 5 Consequently, even prior to the enactment of the
SCPC, South Carolina long had a so-called "purging statute," which removes the
interest of an interested witness.296 The purpose of the purging statute is to
create disinterested witnesses by purging any profit that an otherwise interested
witness might take from the will submitted for probate.297 By converting
interested witnesses into disinterested witnesses, the purging statute attempts to
298
create enough credible witnesses to satisfy the statutory execution formalities.
Whether a witness is deemed interested is determined by comparing the value
that the witness would take under the will submitted for probate with the value
that the witness would take if the will submitted for probate was not valid.299
The witness would profit to the extent the devise to that witness is greater under
the will submitted for probate than what the witness would take if that will was
not valid. The purging statute cleanses the witness of any interest by removing
any profit. 300
Prior to the 2013 amendments, the purging statute considered an interested
witness to be anyone who profited from the will submitted for probate or that
witness's spouse. 3 0 1 The 2013 amendments also consider a witness to be
interested if that witness's issue would profit from the will. 30 2

293. Id.
294. Id. The 2013 amendments increased other dollar limits as well. See infra Part M.D.
295. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1
cint. o (1999).
296. See Davis v. Davis, 208 S.C. 182, 184, 37 S.E.2d 530, 531 (1946) (citing CODE OF LAWS
OF S.C. § 8919 (1942)). The SCPC purging statute is found at S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-504 (2013
amendments).
297. See id. § 62-2-504 reporter's cmt. (2013 amendments).
298. Id. Section 62-2-502 requires a minimum of two attesting witnesses. Id. § 62-2-502.
Prior to the SCPC, South Carolina required a minimum of three attesting witnesses. S.C. CODE
ANN. § 21-7-50 (1976 & Supp. 1986) (repealed 1986).
299. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-504(a) (2013 amendments).
300. See id. The purging statute operates only to the extent necessary to create a disinterested
witness. See id. Thus, a witness may take from the will being submitted for probate to the extent
the witness would have taken without that will. Id. Moreover, if there are at least two disinterested
witnesses without applying the purging statute, any interested supernumerary witness may take the
entire devise under the will being submitted for probate because the supernumerary witness is not
necessary to satisfy the execution requirements of section 62-2-502. See id. §§ 62-2-502, 62-2504(a).
301. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-504 (2009).
302. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-504(a) (2013 amendments).
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9. No Stepchild Intestate Inheritance
The SCPC created a hierarchy of blood relatives who share the intestate
estate if the decedent is not survived by a spouse or issue. 3 03 The eventual heirs
are fairly broad-ranging. The order of priority under the SCPC is: (1) parents,
but if none surviving then (2) issue of parents, 30 4 but if none surviving then (3)
grandparents and their issue,305 but if none surviving then (4) great-grandparents
306
307
and their issue, but if none surviving then to (5) stepchildren and their issue.
Problematically, a stepchild is the child of the decedent's spouse but not the
decedent. 308 The pre-amendment statute did not separately define stepchild for
purposes of intestacy. The decedent's intestate estate would pass to blood
relatives other than the decedent's issue only if the decedent was not survived by
a spouse.309 And if the decedent had no surviving spouse, then who would be a
stepchild for inheritance purposes? 3 10
Because the SCPC had no clear answer to the question regarding who
qualifies to take as a stepchild or issue of a stepchild, the 2013 amendments
eliminate a stepchild and issue of a stepchild as intestate heirs. 31'
10. Creationof Inter Vivos Trusts by Agent or Conservator
Whether a conservator or attorney in fact can create, revoke, or amend a
revocable inter vivos trust for the settlor is an unresolved question in many
312
Because the revocable inter vivos trust is, for many purposes,
jurisdictions.
considered a will substitute in modem estate planning, 313 granting the authority
to an agent or conservator to create or change a revocable trust could practically
be considered tantamount to allowing the agent or conservator to amend the

303. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-103 (2009). Section 62-2-102 describes the intestate share of
any surviving spouse. See id. § 62-2-102.
304. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-103(2H3) (2013 amendments).
305. Id. § 62-2-103(4). At this level, the intestate estate is divided, with half passing to the
maternal grandparent side and half to the paternal grandparent side. Id.
306. Id. § 62-2-103(5). As with the grandparent level, the estate is divided with half passing
to the maternal and paternal sides. Id.
307. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-103(6) (2009).
308. See id. §62-1-201(40).
309. See id. §62-2-103.
310. Possible answers include the children of the decedent's spouse who most recently
predeceased the decedent, the children of the decedent's spouse who was most recently divorced
from the decedent, the children of all of the decedent's spouses who predeceased him, the children
of all of the decedent's spouses who were divorced from him, or some combination.
311. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-103 (2013 amendments), with S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2103 (2009). Similarly, the 2013 amendments eliminated the definition of stepchild previously
found at section 62-1-201(40). Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-201 (2013 amendments), with
S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-201(40) (2009).
312. See, e.g., Medlin, supra note 2, at 146 (discussing the debate that exists over the power of
the attorney-in-fact to revoke or amend the trust).
313. See id. at 140-41.
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settlor's will: if the revocable trust and will work together to constitute a
testator's estate plan, changing the trust will necessarily and concomitantly
change the will.314 For example, revoking the trust will return the trust property
to the settlor's ownership, allowing those assets to eventually become probate
assets governed by the will. 3 15 Conversely, creating and funding a revocable
trust with the settlor's assets will remove those assets from the probate estate
and, eventually, from control by the will. 3 16 Thus, if a conservator creates,
revokes, or amends a revocable trust, the effect may be a change to the settlor's
will, thus contravening the general rule of will revocation allowing onl a
competent testator-not an agent or conservator-to change or revoke a will.
Prior to the 2013 amendments-and echoing the policy from some cases
allowing an agent or conservator to revoke or amend a revocable trust for an
incompetent settlor-the SCPC empowered an agent 18 or a conservator 319 to
revoke or amend a revocable trust. o Significantly, the SCPC was silent as to
whether an agent or conservator could create a revocable trust.
The 2013 amendments clarify the powers afforded to an attorney-in-fact
under a durable power of attorney. 21 The amendments retain the limitation that
the attorney-in-fact is restricted to the extent authorized by the trust or the power
of attorney, and retain the powers to revoke or amend the revocable trust.22 In
addition, the amendments expressly authorize the agent to create a revocable
trust.323 However, the amendments also retain and clarify the prohibition against
using these powers to change the settlor's estate plan: "[E]xercise of the
powers ... shall not alter the amount of property beneficiaries are to receive on
the settlor's death under the settlor's existing will or other estate planning
documents or in the absence thereof in accordance with the law of intestate

succession."324

314. See id. at 146 (recognizing the argument that changing a trust can effectively change a
will).
315. See id. at 150.
316. See id. at 150.
317. See id. at 143, 145-46.
318. An agent could act to the extent authorized by the trust or the power of attorney
"provided the exercise of the power does not alter the designation of beneficiaries to receive the
property on the settlor's death under the settlor's existing estate plan." S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7602(e) (2009).
319. If no conservator was appointed, a guardian could act. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7602(f) (2009). In either case, for a conservator or guardian, the court had to approve the exercise of
the power. See id.
320. See id. § 62-7-602(e)-(t) (2009).
321. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-602A reporter's cmt (2013 amendments).
322. See id. § 62-7-602A(a)(1)-(2).
323. See id. § 62-7-602A(a)(5).
324. See id. § 62-7-602A(c).
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The 2013 amendments also clarify that, subject to the same rules and
restrictions for revocable trusts, the agent can create or add property to an

irrevocable trust.3 25
III. SIGNIFICANT ADMINISTRATION AND PROCEDURE AMENDMENTS

A. Creditors' Claims
1. CreditorsApplying for Appointment as PersonalRepresentatives
The 2013 amendments made several significant changes to the SCPC
process for presenting and handling claims by the decedent's creditors. The
amendments clarify that, with the exception of a creditor applying for
appointment as personal representative, a creditor can present a claim against the
decedent's estate only after the appointment of a personal representative.326
Because the lack of a personal representative thus stymies a creditor from
presenting a claim, that creditor may choose to agly for appointment, or to
nominate another person as personal representative.
The 2013 amendments recognize the problem that can arise if a creditor
seeks appointment but the time to present a claim expires before the court
appoints the creditor.328 Because a claim not timely presented is barred by the
probate claims process, the creditor in such a case could be appointed at a time
during which it is too late to pursue the claim-a Pyrrhic victory.329
Consequently, despite the general prohibition against presenting a claim prior to
the appointment of a personal representative, the amendments allow the creditor
seeking appointment to attach the claim to the appointment application or
petition330 and effectively toll the running of the claims-barring time limits.3 31

325. See id. §62-7-602A(b).
326. See id. §62-3-104 (citing id. § 62-3-804(i)(b)).
327. See id. §§ 62-3-104, -203(8). A creditor has priority for appointment as personal
representative if no other personal representative has applied within forty-five days after the
decedent's death. See id. § 62-3-203(a)(6). A creditor may nominate another person to serve, and
that person will acquire the same priority for appointment as the nominating creditor. See id. § 623-203(a)(8).
328. See §§ 62-3-802 through -804, -806. SCPC article 3, part 8 creates a rather Byzantine set
of time limits for presenting and contesting claims involving a decedent. See id. A detailed
explanation of those time limits is beyond the scope of this Article.
329. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-3-203(a)(6), -801, -803 (2009) (amended 2013).
330. Under the SCPC, a personal representative can be appointed in an informal or a formal
proceeding, depending on the circumstances. See id. §§ 62-3-203(a), -301, -414. An informal
proceeding does not require notice, while a formal proceeding requires notice before a hearing. See
id. § 62-1-201(17), (22). One seeking approval from the court presents an application in an
informal proceeding and a petition in a formal proceeding. See id.
331. See id. §§ 62-3-104, -804(1)(b).
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2. Allowance or Disallowance of Claims
The probate claims process permits a creditor whose claim has been
disallowed to contest or object to the disallowance.332 A creditor receiving
notice of the disallowance has thirty days to contest or object, unless the notice
of disallowance fails to include a warning of the thirty-day time limit. 33 3 If the
creditor fails to timely contest or object to the disallowance, the claim will be
barred.334 Prior to the 2013 amendments, the SCPC did not impose a time limit
for the personal representative to decide whether to allow or disallow a claim.
The only procedure available to a creditor in limbo was to petition the court to
require the personal representative to allow the claim.335 The 2013 amendments
impose a time limit for the personal representative to act on a claim: the later of
sixty days from the presentation of the claim or fourteen months after the
decedent's death. 336 The amendments also clarify that the allowance of a claim
does not guarantee payment.3 37
3.

PublicationofNotice

Before the 2013 amendments, the probate claims process apparently
required the personal representative to publish notice to creditors "notifying
creditors of the estate to present their claims within eight months after the date of
the first publication of the notice or be forever barred."
Because the
publication might occur, in certain circumstances, after claims have been
barred,339 the publication of notice indicating that a creditor has eight months to
present a claim could be deceptive. Consequently, the 2013 amendments

332. See id. § 62-3-804(5).
333. See id. §§ 62-3-804(5), -806.
334. See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
335. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-806(b) (2009).
336. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-806(a) (2013 amendments).
337. See id. § 62-3-806(e). This might appear to be obvious, but presumably this language
was included to obviate the perceived need by some personal representatives to disallow a valid
claim merely because the estate lacks assets to pay it. The payment of claims is prioritized under
SCPC section 62-3-805. See id. § 62-3-805.
338. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-801(a) (2009). Despite the apparent mandate to publish
notice in (a), section 62-3-801(c) exculpated the personal representative for failing to give notice.
See id. § 62-3-801(c). This inconsistency, part of the Byzantine probate claims-barring process, is
partially due to the United State Supreme Court ruling in Tulsa Professional Collection Services,
Inc. v. Pope. 485 U.S. 478, 479, 491 (1988) (holding that termination of a creditor's claim after
providing notice only by publication violated due process when a creditor's identity is known or
reasonably ascertainable). This decision prompted amendments to the UPC and similarly to the
SCPC process. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-801 cmt. (amended 1989), 8 U.L.A. 129 (1998)
(citing Tulsa, 485 U.S. 478); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-803 cmt. (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 133-34
(Supp. 2013) (citing Tulsa, 485 U.S. 478).
339. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-803(a)(1) (2013 amendments). For example, claims could
already be barred when a personal representative is appointed more than one year after the
decedent's death. See id. § 62-3-803(a)(1).
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eliminate the requirement to publish notice when the personal representative is
appointed more than a year after the decedent's death.3
4. Event of Compliance with the Time Limit
Before the amendments, a creditor tolled the time period to present a claim
by either filing the claim with the court or, alternatively, delivering or mailing a
copy to the personal representative-whichever occurred first. 34 1 Thus, if the
personal representative received notice of the claim within the requisite time
period, the claim was timely presented-regardless of when the creditor filed the
claim with the court.342 The 2013 amendments provide that the only action that
will serve to timely present a claim is filing a written statement of the claim with
the court.343
5. Suspension ofAction on Death ofParty
The 2013 amendments also clarify that, when a party dies while an action is
pending, the action is suspended until a personal representative is appointed for
the deceased party.344
B. Tax Apportionment
The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA) 345 provides some
finality to the ambiguous and ephemeral federal transfer tax issues that have
lingered since 2001. 46 Although the ATRA, through a generous $5 million

340. See id. §62-3-801(d).
341. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-804(1) (2009).
342. See, e.g., In re Estate of Tollison, 320 S.C. 132, 136, 463 S.E.2d 611, 614 (Ct. App.
1995) (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-804 (2009)) (holding that the hospital creditor's providing of
records to attorney for decedent's personal representative for evidence in a wrongful death and
survival action served as timely presentation of a claim, even though the hospital did not file the
claim until nearly two years later).
343. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-804(1)(a) (2013 amendments).
344. See id. § 62-3-804(7)(A). While this requirement does not apply to a secured creditor for
purposes of an action involving any security interest, such as a foreclosure, the exception for a
security interest is inapplicable to an action for a default judgment. See id. § 62-3-804(7)(B).
345. See American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 101, 126 Stat. 2313,
2315-18(2013).
346. See id.; Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-16,
115 Stat. 38 ("EGTRRA"). Although publicly proclaimed to have repealed the federal estate tax,
EGTRRA instead incrementally increased the amount of value exempt from the estate tax through
2010. See id. §§ 501, 511, 521, 115 Stat. at 69-72. The EGTRRA temporarily repealed the estate
tax for 2010, but re-imposed that tax in 2011, with only a $5 million exemption amount. However,
signed into law by the President on December 17, 2010, the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance
Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 reinstated the estate tax, albeit with a $5 million
exemption, although that too was considered temporary. See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance
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exemption-indexed for inflation from 2010, along with portability of any
unused exemption from the deceased spouse to the surviving spouse 347
eliminates transfer tax concerns for many people, tax apportionment issues
remain significant for those with potential transfer tax liability.348 Generally,
federal law defers to a decedent's intent for apportioning transfer taxes against
the property being transferred.349 South Carolina law provides a statutory default
system for allocating estate taxes against certain probate and nonprobate assetsbasically, an asset is responsible for the aliquot share of tax caused by the
inclusion of that asset in the estate tax calculation.350 However, South Carolina
law defers to the allocation of taxes expressed by the decedent.351 Generally,
probate assets, as well as nonprobate assets-such as those passing under a
revocable trust-are subject to the federal estate tax.352 The assessment of estate
tax against a devise can substantially affect the value passing to the devisees and
beneficiaries of the decedent.
Example 6. Testator devised $500,000 to A and the residue of the
probate estate to B. The estate tax attributable to the devise to A is $X.
If the testator did not indicate a contrary intent, the South Carolina
apportionment statute would allocate $X of the estate tax against A's
devise, leaving A with a net devise of $500,000 - $X. If, however,
Testator had expressed the intent to allocate all estate taxes against the
residue of the estate, then A's devise would be $500,000, without
reduction for any tax, and B's share of the residue would be reduced by
$X, as well as any other tax otherwise attributable to the value of the
residue.
Because of the importance of tax apportionment, well-drafted estate plans
express the decedent's intent about allocation of the tax against the various
probate and nonprobate transfers, rather than defaulting to the federal and state
systems. However, as revocable trusts become more commonplace as will

Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, §§ 301-02, 124 Stat. 3296,
3300-01.
347. The ATRA allows a surviving spouse to add to the surviving spouse's exemption amount
any unused exemption amount of the deceased spouse-the Deceased Spouse's Unused Exclusion
Amount, or DSUE. See id.; see also I.R.C. § 2010 (Supp. 2012).
348. Effectively, a married couple can exempt as much as $10 million-subject to increase for
inflation since 2010-from federal transfer tax. As with much of the ATRA and the concomitant
transfer and income tax planning issues, portability is highly-nuanced and complex. A substantive
discussion of the ATRA is beyond the scope of this Article.
349. See, e.g., 1.RC. §§ 2207A(a)(2) (2006) (providing that a right of recovery for certain
marital deduction property is waived if a decedent indicates an intent to do so by will).
350. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-916 (2009) (providing South Carolina's version of the
Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act).
351. Id. § 62-3-916(b).
352. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2036(a) (2006) (providing that the gross estate shall include the value
of property passed under trust).
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substitutes and will partners, 35 3 the coordination of the tax apportionment
preferences of the decedent's probate and nonprobate transfers gained increasing
importance. 3 54
Notably, before the 2013 amendments, the state tax
apportionment statute deferred to the decedent's expression of intent in a will.
The statute made no mention of deferring to the decedent's expression of intent
in a revocable trust, nor did it explain how to coordinate a decedent's expression
of intent in both a will and a revocable trust, if different. 35
The 2013
amendments clarify that (a) the expressed intention in a will controls; (b) to the
extent that intent is not expressed in a will, the expressed intention in a revocable
trust controls; and (c) to the extent that two or more revocable trusts contain
conflicting expressions of intent, the most recently dated document controls.357
C. Powers and Duties ofFiduciaries
1. Inventory and Appraisement

A basic duty of a personal representative is to inventory and value assets. 35 8
The SCPC requires the personal representative to file an inventory and
appraisement with the court359 and, before the 2013 amendments, it required the
personal representative to mail a copy to any interested person requesting one.360
The 2013 amendments clarify that the inventory list must include only probate
property and not property passing by nonprobate transfer.361 An interested
person wanting a copy of the inventory and appraisement must file a demand for
notice. 362 However, if an interested person demands an inventory of nonprobate
property, the personal representative must provide a list of that property "so far
as is known to the personal representative . .. ." 363

353. See Medlin, supra note 2, at 140.
354. Tax apportionment of transfer taxes may not be the only tax fairness issue that affects
testators or settlors. While other tax choices, especially postmortem, achieve tax savings, they may
create inequities among beneficiaries. The discussion of these situations is beyond the scope of this
Article, but for a detailed discussion of such issues, see F. Ladson Boyle, Tax Consequences of
Equitable Adjustments, 37 S.C. L. REV. 583 (1986).
355. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-916(b) (2009).
356. See id.
357. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-916(b)(1)-(2) (2013 amendments).
358. See id. §62-3-706(A)(1).
359. See id.
360. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-706(3) (2009). It also allowed the court to grant an extension of
time for filing. See id. Qualification as an interested person under the SCPC varies from time to
time, depending on circumstances. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-201(23) (2013 amendments).
361. See id. § 62-3-706(A)(1). The 2013 amendments also delete the previous requirement
that the personal representative include in the inventory and appraisement any information required
by the South Carolina Department of Revenue. Compare id. (omitting the requirement), with S.C.
CODE ANN. § 62-3-706(1) (2009) (requiring information required by the South Carolina Revenue
Department).
362. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-204 (2013 amendments).
363. Id. § 62-3-706(B)(1).
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Before the 2013 amendments, SCPC section 62-3-704-which lists specific
duties of the personal representative-imposed a possible $1,000 penalty if the
personal representative failed to comply with the inventory and appraisement
requirements of section 62-3-706.364 The 2013 amendments remove the specific
penalty and leave the appropriate remedy to the discretion of the court.365
2.

DistributionofIntestate Property

Before the 2013 amendments, the SCPC authorized the personal
representative to distribute intestate property to the heirs if the personal
representative was unaware at the time of distribution of a pending action to
probate a will or, alternatively, of a pending action to question the personal
representative's authority or appointment. 366 The 2013 amendments clarify that
the personal representative must have received actual notice of such an action to
prevent distribution. 3 67
3.

DigitalProperty

The 2013 amendments clarify that a personal representative has the power to
access the decedent's digital assets-including files and accounts-and to obtain
passwords and user identifications to allow the personal representative to gain
access to those digital assets.368
4.

Trust Protectorsand TrustAdvisors

Generally, settlors use trust protectors and trust investment advisorsdepending on the circumstances-to guide a trustee, to override a trustee, to
achieve favorable tax results, and to act when a trustee should not.369 The 2013
amendments add specific provisions governing the powers and duties of trust
protectors and trust investment advisors. 3 70 Most importantly, the amendments
exculpate a trustee from liability for following the direction of a trust protector
or a trust investment advisor-if required by the trust-unless the trustee
engages in willful misconduct. 3 7 1 When a trust requires a trustee to make
decisions with the consent of a trust protector or a trust investment advisor, the
trustee is not liable if the trust protector or trust investment advisor fails to

364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-704(f) (2009) (citing id. § 62-3-706).
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-704(g) (2013 amendments).
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-703(b) (2009).
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-703(b) (2013 amendments).
See id. § 62-3-715(26).
Id. § 62-7-808 reporter's cint.
See id. §§ 62-7-818,-819,-1005A, -1005B.
See id. §§ 62-7-1005A(A), -1005B(A).
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provide consent after the request. 372 Trust protectors and trust investment
advisors are fiduciaries for the powers granted to them, except in any capacity as

a beneficiary. 3 73
5.

Removal ofa PersonalRepresentativefor Cause

The amendments also clarify that, if a personal representative is removed for
cause, the personal representative's attorney of record owes no further duties to
the court.
6. Closing Estates

The 2013 amendments clarify that, when closing an estate, a personal
representative may avoid the requirements for filing an accounting, filing a
proposal for distribution, or filing a notice of right to demand a hearing if all
interested persons waive the filing requirement. 3 75
7.

Bond Requirement

The 2013 amendments clarify that a court, in its discretion, may eliminate
the duty of a personal representative to provide a bond.376 Prior to the
amendments, the SCPC empowered the court to reduce a bond, but did not
specifically address whether the court could dispense with a bond.377
D. Increase ofAmounts

The 2013 amendments increase dollar limits in several sections of the SCPC:
(1) the amount of personal property that a personal representative can sell
without the authorization of either the testator's will or the court increases from
$5,000 to $10,000;378 (2) the amount of net value qualifying an estate for small
or summary estate administration increases from $10,000 to $25,000;379 (3) the
amount qualifying for the exempt property set-aside increases from $5,000 to

372. See id. §§ 62-7-1005A(B), 1005B(B).
373. See id. §§ 62-7-1005A(D), 1005B(D).
374. See id. §62-3-611(c).
375. See id. §62-3-1001(e).
376. See id. § 62-3-604. For situations in which the personal representative is not required to
provide a bond, see id. §62-3-603.
377. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-604 (2009).
378. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-711(b) (2009) ($5,000 of property), with S.C. CODE
ANN. § 62-3-711(b) (2013 amendments) ($10,000 ofproperty).
379. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-1203(a) (2009) ($10,000 to qualify), with S.C. CODE
ANN. § 62-3-1203(a) (2013 amendments) ($25,000 to qualify).
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$25,000;380 and (4) the amount of the value of an interested person's apparent
interest in the estate to require a bond increases from $1,000 to $5,000.381
IV. EFFECTwE DATE AND PROTECTION OF EXISTING RIGHTS
As with the enactment of the SCPC and the SCTC, the 2013 amendments
contain effective date provisions that generally apply the amendments
retroactively, except when that would divest otherwise vested rights. 382 Several
South Carolina cases misapplied the effective date provisions of the SCPC,
resulting in a divestment of vested rights. 383 In response to these cases, the
General Assembly amended the SCPC effective date provisions-found in
section 62-1-100-which eventually led to the appellate courts reaching correct
results on that issue.384 Moreover, the effective date provisions of the SCTC,
while substantially similar to the effective date provisions of the SCPC, were
crafted to avoid further misapplication by the courts.
The effective date
provisions of the 2013 amendments mirror those of the SCTC.386
V. CONCLUSION

The 2013 amendments continue the evolution of the South Carolina law of
wills, trusts, and fiduciary administration-a progression from the common law
to a statutory codification of substantive rules and administrative procedures. Of
course, the legislative involvement is only part of this evolutionary process.
Judicial interpretations and the practices of estate planning and probate lawyers,
as well as the experiences of the citizens and institutions affected by these laws,
will continue to impact the law's development.

380. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-401 (2009) ($5,000 to qualify), with S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 62-2-401 (2013 amendments) ($25,000 to qualify).

381. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-605 (2009) ($1,000 apparent interest), with S.C. CODE
ANN. § 62-3-605 (2013 amendments) ($5,000 apparent interest).
382. See No. 100, 2013 Acts,
§ 4.
383. See Medlin, supra note 2, at 197-200 (citations omitted).
384. See Medlin, supra note 2, at 201 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-100(b)(5) (2009); In re
Estate of Boynton, 355 S.C. 299, 302, 584 S.E.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 2003)).
385. See Medlin, supra note 2, at 201-02 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. 62-7-1106 (2009)).
386. See No. 100, 2013 Acts , § 4.
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